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Article 2

Title VII and Religious Liberty
Kent Greenawalt*

1. INTRODUCTION

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which forbids religious
discrimination in employment, raises in microcosm some extremely
thorny questions about religious liberty; questions more familiar to most
of us in constitutional settings. In focusing on these questions in their
Title VII context, I am more interested in fundamental conceptual issues
than in the precise details of what that law should be taken to provide.
Among the questions are: What is discrimination because of religion?
How should religion be "defined"? How far should employers
accommodate the religious exercise of workers? Under the First
Amendment, how much accommodation can the federal government
require of private employers? What are an employer's rights to
religious exercise? Has an employer any greater, or lesser, right to
engage in religious speech than other speech? What amounts to
harassment on religious grounds? How far do workers' rights of
religious speech and other speech affect what should count as religious
harassment?
II. THE THREE FACES OF TITLE VII: (1) ORDINARY DISCRIMINATION,
(2)

ACCOMMODATION, AND

(3)

HARASSMENT

As one part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress adopted Title
VII to restrict employment discrimination.I
The Act applies to
employers of fifteen or more persons whose business affects interstate
commerce. 2 An employer cannot discharge, fail to hire, or otherwise
discriminate in terms of employment, against anyone "because of such
*

I am grateful to Glenn George, Cynthia Estlund, Michael Dorf, and Jeremy Waldron, and

the members of the University of North Carolina Law School faculty and participants in the
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal Conference on Law and Religion for very helpful
comments on previous drafts. Michael Dowdle and James Beattie have given me exceptional
research assistance.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
2. Id. § 2000e(b).
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individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"; an employer
cannot segregate or classify his workers in a way that would tend to
deprive someone of employment opportunities "because of...
religion . .."3 Similar restrictions apply to labor unions and to training
and apprenticeship programs. 4 Employers may hire on the basis of
religion (and sex and national origin, but not race or color) when that is
a bona fide occupational qualification. 5 By now, virtually all states
have similar fair employment laws, which reach smaller employers than
6
does the Civil Rights Act.
Discrimination obviously occurs when an employer intentionally
treats a worker disadvantageously because of the worker's religion. But
a purpose to discriminate is not essential for a statutory violation. Early
on, the Supreme Court adopted a partially objective test of what
constitutes discrimination under Title VII. 7 If an employer uses a test or
other standard for employment that disproportionately favors members
of one race (or gender or religion) over another, reliance on the test
constitutes discrimination unless the employer can show that the test is
required by business necessity. 8 In 1989, the Supreme Court
9
significantly restricted opportunities for recovery under this theory;
Congress responded by adopting a statute that brought the law back to
10
its pre- 1989 posture.
Well after passage of the Act, courts accepted the theory that
harassment constituted a form of discrimination. 1" If the working

3. Id. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) to (2).
4. Id. §§ 2000e-2(c) to (d).
5. Id. § 2000e-2(e).
6. As in the Federal Act, the basic statutory language covering religious discrimination is the
same as that applying to discrimination by race, sex, and national origin.
7. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that the "Act requires the
elimination of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment that operate
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race").
8. Id. at 431.
9. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (holding that the proper
comparison to be made in the employment context is "between the racial composition of the atissue jobs and the racial composition of the qualified population in the relevant labor market").
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C). These developments are discussed in Steven D. Jamar,
Accommodating Religion at Work: A PrincipledApproach to Title VII and Religious Freedom, 40
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 735-38 (1996). He points out that establishing a statistical imbalance is
much more complicated for religion than for race and gender, because of numbers of subgroups
of major religions and the presence of sects so small it will be impossible to say what a natural
proportion of members in the work force would be. Id. at 794-95.
11. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (holding that a "claim of 'hostile
environment' sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that is actionable under Title
VII").
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environment becomes seriously compromised because of one's race,
gender, or religion, that can amount to discrimination in "terms of
employment." Even if a worker shows no other deprivation of
employment opportunities, she has a statutory claim if12she suffers
harassment for which her employer has become responsible.
Another post-1964 development was in the statutory language itself.
In 1970, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employer could
meet his obligations under the statute by treating workers similarly,
without respect to their religion. 13 The Supreme Court affirmed by an
equally divided court. 14 Congress responded in 1972 with a new
subsection, formulated as a definitional section, which provides: "The
term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and practice,
as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to
reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's
religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct
of the employer's business."' 15 This language is confusing in suggesting
that whether an observance or practice is religious (under the Act)
depends on its being able to be reasonably accommodated. 16 That
would certainly be an inadequate approach to the problem of what
counts as religious; a practice is no less religious because the employer
cannot accommodate it. But the practical thrust is clear enough. Unless
the employer makes a required accommodation, he has discriminated
under the statute.
Thus, Title VII forbids what I shall call simple, or ordinary,
discrimination, failures to accommodate, and harassment. (This
threefold distinction is drawn for analytical purposes and because the
necessary elements for recovery may differ, not to suggest doubt that
harassment qualifies as discrimination as defined by the statute.)
In some instances, disentangling these threads is not easy, but the
basic ideas are straightforward.
When a person is denied an
employment opportunity because an employer or supervisor makes a
12. Because Title V1I does not directly regulate the activities of fellow workers, workplace
harassment becomes a wrong under the Act only where the employer bears responsibility for it in
some way. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
13. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970). See Jamar, supra note 10,
at 741-42.
14. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971). An affirmance by an equally
divided court has no precedential value.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). The statute adopted the approach of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission toward accommodation. See Thomas D. Brierton, An Unjustified
Hostility Toward Religion in the Workplace, 34 CATH. LAW. 289, 293 (1991).
16. Justice Rehnquist described the language as awkwardly drafted in Ansonia Board of
Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 63 n.1(1986).

4
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negative judgment based on her religion, she has suffered ordinary
discrimination. A worker seeks an accommodation if she asks for an
exemption from a standard practice that the employer has developed
without respect to religious considerations. The worker may be an
Orthodox Jew who wants Saturday off, or a Muslim who wants a brief
time to pray when other workers are busy. Finally, if Christian workers
taunt a Jewish colleague, making working conditions very unpleasant,
the victimized worker has suffered harassment. If, after she has
complained, supervisors do nothing to stop the abuse, the statute has
been violated.
EEOC v. Townley Engineering & Manufacturing Co. 17 is a case in
which the threads of ordinary discrimination, accommodation, and
harassment intertwine. A married couple who founded and (mostly)
owned the Townley Engineering and Manufacturing Company wanted
to operate "a Christian, faith-operated business." 18 All workers were
required to attend weekly devotional services at which some business
matters were discussed.19 Pelvas, an atheist, asked to be excused. 20 His
supervisor said attendance was mandatory, but told Pelvas he could
sleep or read a newspaper during the services. 21 One might view
mandatory worship services themselves as discriminating against
nonbelievers. One might think such services would harass some
nonbelievers.
One might believe that the company should
accommodate those nonbelievers who objected to attending by excusing
22
them. I shall return to this important case.
III. WHAT IS DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF RELIGION: A FIRST PASS
The statute bars discrimination "because of [an] individual's
religion." 23 The question of what amounts to such discrimination can
arise for ordinary discrimination, accommodation, and harassment. I
assume here that we are not in doubt about what constitutes religious
beliefs and practices; that fundamental problem is tackled later. I
assume that discrimination against Jews is "religious," although those
engaging in such discrimination may not care about the individual

17. EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988).
18. Id. at 610-12.
19. Id. at 612.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See infra notes 34-38, 106-21, 142-46 and accompanying text (discussing the difficult
questions of discrimination and accommodation in the Townley case).
23. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).

2001]

Title VII and Religious Liberty

religious views of their victims. I also assume that atheists can be
victims under the statute if their failure to embrace religion, or a
particular religion, is the source of discrimination. Finally, I assume
more generally that a worker may be a victim of discrimination because
she does not accept a particular religion, even if the employer is
24
otherwise indifferent about her religion.
The two subjects I address are: (1) the relationship among the
speaker's selection of his audience, the content of his speech, and the
nature of the listener's response; 25 and (2) the relation of an employer's
or worker's religious convictions to her moral responses. 26
In
approaching these topics, I concentrate more on what activities should
be restricted than exactly how a literalist would parse the statutory
phrase "because of [an] individual's religion."
A. Selection, Content, and Response
Title VII discrimination can involve a "tangible adverse employment
action" or the creation of a "hostile environment." 27 One familiar form
of adverse employment action is the carrying out of a quid pro quo
threat, familiar from the law of gender discrimination. A boss says to a
worker, "I will promote you, but only if you have sex with me." This
form of harassment can also occur in the context of religion. 28 The boss
says, "I will promote you, but only if you leave your church and join
mine." The most interesting problems about discrimination because of
religion do not involve quid pro quo threats, but speech by an employer
or fellow worker that creates a difficult working environment. I focus
on that.
When employers (or fellow workers) perform actions that offend
workers, religion may figure in three different ways: An employer's
practice or speech may be religious; it may be directed at a worker
because of her religion; 29 it may cause her offense on religious
24. See Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 971-72 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that a Title
VII claim can be made when the situation involves someone subjecting an employee to lectures
about prospects for salvation, inquiring into her private life, and telling her that she has led a
sinful life).
25. See infra notes 27-43 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 45-59 and accompanying text.
27. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753-54 (1998).
28. See Venters, 123 F.3d at 956; Eileen B. Goldsmith, Note, God's House, or the Law's, 108
YALE L.J. 1433 (1999) (discussing the recent trend for the court to "overcome the formalistic
barriers between sexual harassment and other forms of harassment, as well as those between Title
VII harassment and disparate treatment doctrines").
29. A remark is "directed" in this sense if it is made to a more general audience, but with the
aim of reaching those of a particular religion.
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grounds. 30 The three ways may be combined; in that event, if other
requisites are satisfied, ordinary religious discrimination or religious
harassment undoubtedly is involved. If religion is not involved in any
of the three ways, religious discrimination has not occurred. What if
religion is involved in only one or two of the ways? In exploring this
question, I shall assume for the most part that the offending speech or
other action is the employer's, and I initially put aside his own free
speech and free exercise claims. I concentrate on what makes the best
sense for the category of religious discrimination; I do not undertake the
close examination of how comparable circumstances are treated in the
law of gender and racial discrimination that would be called for were a
lawyer arguing about one of these situations before a court.
If an employer selects a worker for negative treatment based on her
religion, the action is undoubtedly religious discrimination if the worker
suffers tangible employment disadvantages. If harassment is included,
selection on grounds of religion is discriminatory if either of the other
two factors relating to religion is present. First, if an employer
persistently proselytes a worker because of her religion and despite her
expressed wish that he stop, the harassment is because of her religion,
even if her disturbance at his hectoring does not arise from her religious
convictions or identity. 3 1 Second, if an employer chooses a worker
because of her religion, and she is deeply disturbed on religious grounds
at his insistent advocacy, this constitutes religious harassment even
though the content of the discourse is not explicitly religious. Thus, if
an employer continually extols the virtues of gay marriage to a worker
just because she is Roman Catholic, 32 and she is disturbed as a Catholic,
33
he has engaged in religious harassment.

30. Offense on religious grounds need not involve a sense of violation of one's religious
convictions. It is enough that one's identity as a member of a religion is offended.
31. In this respect, a claim for accommodation differs. That depends on a religious belief or
practice of the claimant.
32. I mean here that the employer picks the worker out because she is Roman Catholic, not
just that he wants to talk to likely opponents of gay marriage and assumes that she falls into that
category because she is a Catholic.
33. What exactly it means to choose someone because of her religion can be somewhat
complicated. In Finnemore v. Bangor Hydro-Electric Co., a state decision interpreting language
like that of the federal statute, a fundamentalist Christian worker sought a judgment that he had
been harassed in a way that amounted to religious discrimination. Finnemore v. Bangor HydroElec. Co., 645 A.2d 15 (Me. 1994). Co-workers, he alleged, had made sexually explicit
comments about each other's wives in his presence. Id. at 16. He had complained that such talk
was offensive to his religion. Id. The co-workers responded by making his wife the target of
their sexually explicit comments. Id. Finnemore complained to management, which failed to
take action against his co-workers. Id. The trial court entered summary judgment on the ground
that the co-workers' comments were not religious. Id. at 16 & n.2. The Maine Supreme Judicial
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A somewhat harder case arises if the employer's selection is based on
religion, but neither his speech nor the grounds of offense are religious.
Suppose the employer urges support of gay marriage to a worker
because she is Roman Catholic; she feels serious discomfort about
advocacy of recognition for homosexual rights and complains, but she
does not attach her discomfort to her religious convictions or identity.
Selection on the basis of religion alone is definitely an adequate ground
for concern if the worker reasonably understands that the employer is
aiming to humiliate or embarrass, rather than persuade. I am inclined to
think selection on the basis of religion can be sufficient to involve the
statute even if an employer's motives are benign and the worker
understands that.
We face more difficult issues when an employer has not selected his
audience based on their religion. The employer has a religious message
he wants conveyed both to co-believers and those of different views. A
worker does not want to hear the religious messages that she rejects.
Her ground of offense may derive from her own religious convictions or
identity, or be substantially independent of those.
The status of such employer messages is sharply posed by mandatory
religious meetings. The EEOC argued in Townley that having a
requirement of mandatory attendance at religious services was
discrimination under Title VII. 34 The firm argued that Title VII did not
35
cover its policy and that to do so would violate the First Amendment.

Court reversed. Id. at 17. It said, "[a] test for determining whether a comment is of a religious
nature is whether it occurred because of an individual's religious beliefs or would not have
occurred but for the individual's religion." Id. Whether that standard was met was an issue of
fact. The decision itself is clearly correct. If a worker is singled out because of his religion and
suffers remarks that disturb him deeply because of his religion, that amounts to discrimination
because of religion even if the remarks themselves lack religious content.
The decision is correct, but the exact "test" the court suggests is either imprecise or flawed.
Suppose the fact finder, hearing testimony from the co-workers, reaches the following
conclusion: They knew Finnemore was offended by their remarks and they knew his offense was
religious because he said so, but they thought his whole attitude was ridiculous. They felt that
real men indulge in crude humor, and anyone who complains about that is a pest who deserves to
be rided until he changes his attitude or gets off the job. The fact finder concludes that the men
would have acted similarly toward Finnemore if he had objected on non-religious grounds. How
does the court's test apply? The employer can argue that the co-workers would have made
Finnemore's wife their target even if his religion was different, or he had no religion, so long as
he had complained. Finnemore can argue that he would not have complained but for his religion,
so the co-workers' remarks occurred because of his religion. The court's language could be taken
to apply or not to apply. The important point is that religious harassment occurred if the coworkers' taunting was based on Finnemore's complaint, and they knew that his complaint had a
religious basis. These conditions were clearly satisfied.
34. EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 612 (9th Cir. 1988).
35. Id. at 613.

8

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

Whether or not the firm had to accommodate Pelvas by excusing him,
an issue I discuss below, 36 was the court of appeals right to conclude
that the company did not have to end its mandatory services?
Because its analysis of the legality of a mandatory service was not
consistently separate from its analysis of the worker's claim to be
excused, the court's treatment of the requirement that workers attend the
services is not entirely clear. The judges apparently believed that
mandatory services would have constituted religious discrimination,
except for the employer's free exercise claim. 37 However, under a
compelling-interest-least-restrictive-means analysis, ending mandatory
services was not necessary to accomplish the goals of Title VII.
Therefore, the district court was mistaken in ordering the employer to
38
end mandatory services.
If those who object can be excused, the decision whether to permit
mandatory services may seem to make no practical difference, but that
would be a mistake. Workers can be required to attend legally
permitted mandatory services if they have no objection based on their
religion to doing so and if the services do not create a hostile
environment for them. To be excused a worker must come forward and
explain that attendance is at odds with her own religious beliefs or
practices (the basis for an accommodation), or creates a hostile
environment (the basis for relief from harassment). Some workers will
be hesitant to assert either of these bases to be excused, so a court's
allowing of mandatory services means that more workers will attend the
services than if the services were voluntary.
The mandatory service issue is troubling. Laura Underkuffler has
forcefully argued that a "valid claim of religious discrimination in
employment should be limited to situations in which the employee's
religious status (religious affiliation or identity, or lack thereof) is the
reason for the employer's action." 39 The Townleys wanted all
employees, regardless of their present beliefs and memberships, to
attend their services, so they did not discriminate under the standard

36. See infra notes 37-38, 106-21, 142-46 and accompanying text (discussing the difficult
question of accommodation in the Townley case).
37. Townley, 859 F.2d at 613.
38. Id. at 621. One might view the opinion as declaring that the First Amendment bars what
Title VII here requires-the ending of mandatory services-but the opinion can better be taken to
say that, read in light of the First Amendment, Title VII does not require that mandatory services
be stopped.
39. Laura S. Underkuffler, 'Discrimination' on the Basis of Religion: An Examination of
Attempted Value Neutrality in Employment, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 581, 613 (1989) (emphasis
added).
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Underkuffler attacks the myth of value
Underkuffler proposes.
neutrality and urges that the state cannot and should not choose between
40
employment philosophies or policies based on their religious source.
The strength of her argument is much greater for moral and business
judgments based on religious premises than it is for explicit religious
indoctrination. If the state forbids religious discrimination, it properly
limits mandatory religious indoctrination.
Some examples illustrate the force of this point. Suppose an
employer has about an even mix of Christian and Jewish workers, and
he requires all workers to sit through a Christian service once a day.
One might fairly say that constitutes discrimination in terms of
employment against Jews, if they are required to sit through a Christian
service and Christians are not required to sit through a Jewish service.
To sharpen this, suppose two hours of each day are devoted to
mandatory Roman Catholic services; would that not be discrimination
against non-Catholics? It may well be that some non-Catholics will not
mind such services and that some Catholics will be troubled by them, so
complaints about the services will not be perfectly correlated with any
set of religious beliefs and practices. Further, no one is treated
according to his or her religious status. Still, the services seem to
constitute an unfavorable condition of employment for those who do not
practice Roman Catholicism. Part of the problem is that requiring
workers to attend particular kinds of services may work as a device to
assure that one hires practicing co-believers (since others will be put off
and look elsewhere for work). But I do not mean to rely mainly on that
concern.
If we put aside the force of the employer's own religious claims, the
better view is that mandatory religious services do discriminate against
those who reject the perspective of the services; forcing workers to
listen to one religion is discriminatory against those of other religious
views. An employer definitely cannot insist that workers attend Sunday
services of his favorite church, even if workers are also free to go to
other services. If the employer made attendance at his church a
condition of employment, he would definitely be discriminating against
members of other religions. It should not matter that the employer
41
sponsors the services during business hours.

40. Id. at 599-610.
41. Does it matter that he is paying workers during business hours? I think not. If one
conceives of a salary as paid for fulfilling a set of obligations, the employer who insists that
workers attend his church on Sunday must set his salary high enough to cover that time away
from business hours. Indeed, one way to perceive a difference in terms of employment is to think
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This conclusion is strengthened if we think of analogous cases
regarding gender and race. If an employer calls regular meetings at
which his representative engages in persistent racist or sexist
expression, that should amount to simple discrimination against the
members of the races or gender that are "put down."
What difference does it make whether mandatory services are viewed
as involving simple discrimination in conditions of employment or as
creating a hostile environment that sustains a finding of harassment?
Both the theory of a challenge and the appropriate remedy may be
affected. If mandatory services constitute ordinary discrimination, a
nonbeliever can object whatever his own psychological reaction to
having to attend.4 2 Her objection need not involve severe distress nor
relate to her own religion. She may feel simply that the employer's
mandatory meetings fail to show due respect for workers. A harassment
claim requires that a victim subjectively perceives the environment that
is created as pervasively hostile, 43 and perhaps that feeling must relate
to her religious identity (if the employer has not selected her on the
basis of religion).
The remedy for simple discrimination is to stop the practice. One
possible remedy for a hostile environment violation that does not
involve intentional abuse may be to change circumstances for the victim
so she is no longer subjected to what disturbs her. That is, if a practice
would otherwise be acceptable, but for the victim's feelings of being
harassed, a court might decide that the practice can continue if the
victim is no longer exposed to it and suffers no disadvantage.
The conclusion I have reached, that mandatory religious meetings
discriminate is a tentative one. One might concede everything I have
said thus far, but claim that an employer's interest in the free exercise of
religion is strong enough to warrant mandatory services. My argument
here has been that an employer may discriminate because of religion
even if he does not select his audience on the basis of religion.
of the effective salary as being higher for workers who would attend the employer's church in any
event. They need no extra compensation, and so are receiving a kind of windfall.
42. Some writers have assumed that, for atheists, prayer services are only a waste of time, not
an offense to their religious views. See, e.g., David L. Gregory, Religious Harassment in the
Workplace: An Analysis of the EEOC's Proposed Guidelines,56 MONT. L. REV. 119, 139 (1995).
I think this misses the way in which an atheist could be offended in conscience by forced
attendance at ceremonies she thinks have no ground in reality; but even the "waste of time"
objection would be sufficient for challenging ordinary discrimination.
43. According to Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., conduct constitutes harassment only if it
creates an environment a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and the victim
subjectively perceives the working environment in that way. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
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A final variation on the theme of non-selectivity involves an
employer who engages in non-religious speech that is directed at all
workers and a worker who is offended on religious grounds. Although
the employer's concern is not related to his religion and the basis for
selecting his audience has nothing to do with religion, nevertheless,
some workers are offended because of their religious convictions or
identity. For example, an employer might strongly urge his workers to
eat pork because that would be good for the state's economy; that might
disturb workers who are Orthodox Jews or Muslims. Alternatively, an
employer's strong advocacy of abortion rights might offend a Roman
Catholic.
If religiously grounded offense is essentially fortuitous from the
employer's point of view (and reasonable workers would understand
this), he has not engaged in ordinary discrimination; and I am inclined
to think that he has not engaged in harassment because of religion,
whatever accommodation rights a victim might have. However, these
conclusions may be altered if the employer's non-religious speech is of
a sort that would predictably cause religious offense to a substantial
proportion of his work force.
I shall return to the crucial question of the employer's interests in free
exercise and free speech, 44 but now I turn to my second question about
discrimination because of religion: the complexities of moral judgments
that relate to religious convictions. An actual case helps to pose the
45
central issue. Ms. Turic, a single woman, had become pregnant.
Other members of a "very Christian" restaurant staff were offended by
discussions about whether she should have an abortion. 46
The
restaurant manager and her assistant were concerned that gossip about
the situation was disruptive. 47 They told Turic not to discuss her
consideration of an abortion at work and said she would be terminated if
she did discuss the topic. 48 She was subsequently fired, at least in part
because of the abortion controversy. 49 She won her claim that her firing
violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978.50

44. See infra notes 146-71 and accompanying text.
45. Turic v. Holland Hospitality, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 544, 546 (W.D. Mich. 1994), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 85 F.3d 1211 (6th Cir. 1996).
46. id.
47. Id. at 547.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 550, 556.
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Turic also argued that she had suffered religious discrimination under
Title VII because her firing was "to protect the religious sensibilities of
the rest of the staff," thereby forcing their religion on her. 5 1 The court
indicated that a Title VII claim can succeed if someone is fired, not
because of the nature of her own religious views, but because she does
not share the religious views of the employer or other workers. 52 The
court found inadequate evidence that the feelings of others on the staff
53
were connected to religious doctrine.
The interesting question is whether Title VII should apply if the
firing had been responsive to the religiously informed sensibilities of
the employer or other workers. Let us imagine that Turic had engaged
in legally permitted acts, not themselves protected under any antidiscrimination law-say, she frequently became drunk in public away
from work. The rest of the staff became offended because they
regarded this behavior as sinful from a religious point of view.
We can take the analysis in two steps, asking first about employer
offense and then about offense to other workers. Suppose the nonreligious behavior was directly offensive to the employer's own
religiously based moral sentiments. Our imaginary Turic would not be
fired because of her religious practices or beliefs, or even because her
religious beliefs failed to conform with the employer's beliefs. The
employer could argue that Turic was being fired for a reason that had
nothing to do with what she regarded as religious beliefs and practices.
Still, she would be fired because her sense of appropriate practices
revealed itself to be different from the employer's, and this difference
connected to their differing religious understandings. On a conceptual
level, whether this should count as religious discrimination is
reasonably arguable, but when one considers what an employer can
undoubtedly do, he has the better of the argument.
In most states, employers can fire workers because they find
continual drunkenness to be immoral or disgusting from a non-religious
point of view. 54 Suppose this employer thinks drunkenness is immoral,

51. Id. at 551.
52. Id. The court relied on Blalock v. Metal Trades, Inc., in which the plaintiff was fired
partly because his religious views came to differ from those of his employer. Blalock v. Metal
Trades, Inc., 775 F.2d 703, 705-06 (6th Cir. 1985), affd, 833 F.2d 1011 (6th Cir. 1987).
53. Turic, 849 F. Supp. at 556.
54. One might think that employers should not fire people because of their private lives, even
that the government should forbid them from doing so; and some states statutes and common law
doctrines protecting privacy give a measure of protection. My comments assume a regime in
which employers are free legally to condition employment on workers satisfying moral standards
outside work.
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but his judgment happens to rest on a religious base. The employer's
latitude to invoke his sense of moral appropriateness should not be
limited because the sense happens to derive from religious conviction.
This is the force of Laura Underkuffler's argument that the state
should not choose between employment philosophies because they
happen to be based on religion. 55 The point is most obvious if one
focuses on conditions at work or behavior outside of work that bears
directly on how a worker performs her job. An employer who has
religious reasons for insisting on cheerfulness and discipline among his
workers should be as able to fire a surly or irresponsible worker as an
employer whose reasons for wanting cheerful, disciplined workers have
nothing to do with religion. 56 But, the employer's ability to act on
religiously informed judgments should also extend to behavior outside
work that does not directly affect job performance so long as other
employers might find the behavior morally objectionable on nonreligious grounds.
The conclusion that an employer may fire a worker who frequently
becomes drunk away from work finds further support from the
employer's power to fire a worker who shares his religious beliefs and
acknowledges that drunkenness is deeply sinful, but cannot resist the
temptation to drink. 7 The employer's grounds for firing treat
employees equally, independent of their own religious views.
Whatever conclusion one reaches about the employer acting on his
own religious sentiments should apply to an employer who responds to
the sentiments of his workers.5 8 Suppose Turic had been fired because
her fellow workers regarded her life outside work as immoral. In most
states, that itself would not be a forbidden ground of termination
(though perhaps it should be). Whether or not the co-workers' basis for
moral judgment happens to be a religious one that Turic does not share
should not be crucial.
The issue becomes more complicated if the moral judgment is one
that virtually no one would make except on religious grounds. If a strict
Christian employer is offended because a worker played baseball on
Sunday, and the worker is fired in consequence, that would seem to
amount to discrimination because of religion. This moral judgment

55. Underkuffler, supra note 39, at 588-89.
56. See id. at 605.
57. 1 have not addressed the situation in which the worker's practice is demanded or
encouraged by her religion. That worker has a stronger argument that she is being dismissed
because of her religion, or that at least she should be accommodated.
58. See Turic, 849 F. Supp. at 546.
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operates strongly to the disadvantage of those who happen not to share
the employer's religious convictions, and reliance on it could well be a
means to remove employees of different faiths. On reflection, this case
turns out to be analogous to an employer compelling all his workers to
listen to his religious message. Here, the employer insists that his
religiously based, rather idiosyncratic, standards of proper behavior be
followed.
Perhaps the right criterion for determining whether a religiously
based moral judgment should be conceived as underlying impermissible
religious discrimination is whether in our culture, other employers
might react similarly on non-religious grounds. If they would not, the
employer who takes a negative action toward a worker would be taken
59
to have discriminated on the basis of religion.
I should acknowledge that this proposal has serious difficulties and
an important ambiguity, but I now see no preferable resolution.
One difficulty involves the line between outright religious criteria of
judgment and moral judgments based on religion; another concerns the
possible interference with religious diversity that the proposal permits.
The ambiguity is whether the basis for assessing employers' judgments
is their rationale or the behavior they reach in particular instances.
An employer cannot fire a worker because the worker fails to
conform with the requirements of the employer's religion, for example,
for failing to attend church on Sunday or to keep a kosher household.
Such a firing would constitute religious discrimination, even if some
other employers might regard similar behavior as immoral from a nonreligious point of view.
My proposal, thus, implicitly distinguishes direct religious criteria of
judgment (not permitted) from religiously based moral judgments
(permitted, but only if other employers might make similar moral
judgments on non-religious grounds). Moral judgments would include
sentiments about how people act toward each other and care for their
own persons.
Although distinguishing direct judgments about
compliance with religious obligations from moral judgments is a
daunting task, this line has limited practical importance for my
proposal. An employer can act only if other employers would make
similar judgments on non-religious grounds, and this will usually not be
59. By this criterion, firing someone who drinks a slight amount of alcohol socially probably
amounts to religious discrimination. Even though people might believe on non-religious grounds
that total abstinence is desirable, few people condemn a slight drinking of alcohol as morally
abhorrent, except on religious grounds, and few employers, without religious grounds, would
seek to fire anyone who engages in modest social drinking.
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the case for straightforward employer judgments that a worker has
failed to satisfy religious obligations.
Of greater practical concern is the fate of religious diversity. If an
employer can fire a worker who exhibits some moral failing, one that
would trouble some other employers on non-religious grounds,
employers may end up without workers who fail to conform to their
religiously grounded moral beliefs. This will reduce religious diversity
in those workplaces. Perhaps attaining religious diversity in workplaces
is not a direct goal of Title VII, but it is at least an important side
benefit.
My approach requires a difficult determination about how many other
employers would need to make similar judgments on non-religious
grounds in order for an employer to hire or fire according to his
religiously grounded moral sense. If a judge need only conceive that
some other employer might make such a non-religious judgment, an
employer could, for example, fire workers for any social drinking of
alcohol. This would give religious employers great latitude to fire on
the basis of religiously informed moral judgments and would
correlatively curb the freedom of some workers to live outside work as
they see fit. To meet this problem, I would say that in order for an
employer to fire on the basis of religiously based morality, it must be
the case that other employers would make similar moral judgments on
non-religious moral grounds with some frequency. This would preclude
firing for modest social drinking.
This leads us to the crucial ambiguity-whether the employer's
liberty is to be based on his rationale or on the worker behavior that the
rationale happens to reach in that instance. For example, W becomes
drunk frequently outside of work. E learns of this and fires W, but E
explains that he would fire any worker who drinks at all socially, that
frequency and degree of intoxication are irrelevant to him. Other
employers might find W's behavior morally offensive on non-religious
grounds, but, I am assuming, they would not fire workers for all social
drinking. In favor of concentrating on W's behavior, it may be said that
E should be able to respond to the same behavior employers not relying
on religious grounds would find morally offensive. Further, discerning
E's exact reasons for acting will be difficult, so it is better for the law to
focus on W's behavior.
On the other hand, if E acts on unacceptable reasons, that sends a
message that E is using grounds for a decision that one would not find
among non-religious employers. I believe that an employer should be
able to act only if: (1) a worker's behavior is such that other employers

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

would find it objectionable on non-religious grounds; and (2) the
employer has a reason for acting that, apart from its religious base, other
employers might share. In the instance of frequent drunken behavior,
most employers who find all drinking unacceptable could probably say
honestly that they find excessive drinking and drunken behavior to be
particularly objectionable. On this basis, the employer where judgment
about drinking is religiously informed could fire the worker who is
frequently drunk.
IV. ACCOMMODATION: APPROPRIATE DEGREE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
JUSTIFICATION

I shall return to difficult questions about ordinary discrimination and
harassment raised by the interests of employers and workers in the free
exercise of religion and in free speech. But let us first take a look at
accommodation.
In Wilson v. U.S. West Communications,6° a woman wore an antiabortion button at work; the button had a color photograph of an
eighteen to twenty-week-old fetus. 6 1 Ms. Wilson's wearing of the
button was an exercise of her religion. The button was not religious on
its face, and someone might have worn it for other than religious
reasons. But Wilson was a Roman Catholic who had made a religious
vow to wear the button "until there was an end to abortion or until [she]
could no longer fight the fight."-62 "Wilson chose this particular button
because .... [s]he believed that the Virgin Mary would have chosen
this particular button." 6 3 Wilson "wanted to be an instrument of God
64
like the Virgin Mary."
The button caused disruption at work. Some co-workers found the
button disturbing for personal reasons, such as infertility problems,
miscarriage, and death of a premature infant. 65 Some threatened to
walk off the job. 66 (No workers, apparently, claimed that they felt
harassed because of their religious beliefs.) Supervisors offered Wilson
the options of: (1) wearing the button only in her cubicle; (2) covering
the button; or (3) wearing a "button with the same message but without

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Wilson v. U.S. West Communications, 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1339.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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68
the photograph. 6 7 She refused all the options and was dismissed.
Wilson argued that the co-workers should have been instructed to either
69
ignore or tolerate the button.
The court of appeals decided that U.S. West had offered a reasonable
accommodation, and that was all it was required to do.70 Part of the
decision that U.S. West had offered a "reasonable accommodation" was
based on the district court's conclusion that Wilson's views did not
require her to be a living witness. 7 1 Had this issue been resolved in
favor of Wilson, the supervisors' offers might all have been
unreasonable because none of them allowed her to witness at work,
outside her cubicle, with this button. I believe the court of appeals was
mistaken in its treatment of reasonable accommodation, but that its final
conclusion was correct because of "undue hardship."
A preliminary question is the state of affairs against which one
evaluates an offer of accommodation. The behavior of the supervisors
must be judged according to what they could reasonably understand, not
on the basis of a worker's uncommunicated feelings. But an
accommodation should not count as reasonable if supervisors should not
have supposed it would resolve a worker's religious conflict, given all
the facts that the supervisors learned during their conversations with the
worker.
The court of appeals' handling of the "living witness" issue was
unsatisfactory on two counts. The central question was not, as the
judges suggested, whether the district court clearly erred,72 but whether
the district court's finding was appropriate given the limited scope of
inquiry courts should make about a complainant's religious
understanding. In cases such as these, courts must be ready to make
some determinations about sincerity, but they should not declare a claim
to be insincere if that is in serious doubt. Wilson's understanding of her
vow should have been accepted unless it was obviously insincere. 73 By

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1342.
71. Id. at 1341.
72. Id. at 1340.
73. The parties had stipulated that Wilson was sincere, but the district court said that the
stipulation did not cover the details of her vow. Id. at 1341. If Wilson had clearly indicated on
other occasions that her vow did not include a particular element, a judge could decide that it
lacked that element even if she claimed that it included that element at the time of suit. However,
any uncertainties should have been resolved in Wilson's favor.
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that standard, the district court erred because it did not give Wilson the
74
benefit of the doubt.
The second unsatisfactory aspect of the court of appeals disposition
was its emphasis on the exact content of Wilson's initial vow. Suppose
that when she made that vow Wilson had not focused on whether she
needed merely to wear the button or to have it exposed to view. When
the supervisors offered her the button-covering option, she realized that
she felt compelled to keep the button exposed.
If she then
communicated that to her supervisors, the supervisors should have taken
her religious practice as wearing this particular button, exposed, in the
75
entire workplace.
74. Both courts did refer to what Wilson had said on other occasions, but those statements did
not decisively resolve whether her oath included being a living witness. See id. at 1340-41.
75. If Wilson's communications to her supervisors had been unclear, and they reasonably
thought that neither her vow nor her present sentiments required an exposed button, their
proposed accommodations may have been reasonable, even if her actual sentiments rendered
them inadequate. But conversations between Wilson and her supervisors definitely revealed her
claim that the button had to be exposed. Id. at 1339.
In Chalmers v. Tulon Co., a divided court resolved the issue of when a worker must inform an
employer about the need for accommodation. Chalmers v. Tulon Co., 101 F.3d 1012, 1020 (4th
Cir. 1996). Motivated by religious concerns, an evangelical Christian worker wrote to her
immediate supervisor, LaMantia, at his home, suggesting that he was doing something in his life
that God was not pleased with. Id. at 1015. Chalmers had in mind that LaMantia had given
customers false information about the turn-around time for jobs. Id. The supervisor's wife
opened and read the letter, and concluded that her husband was committing adultery. Id.
Chalmers was subsequently fired, not because of her religious views, but because the letter had
caused her boss anguish and put a strain on his marriage. Id. at 1017. The court affirmed a
summary judgment for the company, concluding that Chalmers had not been dismissed because
of her religion, that she had no claim for an accommodation because she had not asked for one
prior to sending the letter, and that, in any event, the employer could not be expected to
accommodate to the sending of disturbing personal letters. Id. at 1021.
As Judge Niemeyer's dissent points out, the majority's approach on the question of notice is
too rigid. Id. at 1025-26 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). Only when her letter caused such turmoil did
Chalmers realize that what she was doing was at odds with what the company wanted. That was
the appropriate time to see if an accommodation could be reached. Although she was moved to
send the letter (and at least one other) by a religious impulse, she never indicated that she felt a
religious obligation to mail letters to the homes of fellow employees. She might have limited
herself to conversations and notes at work, if told to do so. The employer could have taken the
occasion to wam her and to see if she would accept a reasonable accommodation that would fit
with its business needs. Its firing her without exploring that option should have been regarded as
a failure to accommodate.
But the case had a special feature. What Chalmers had already done had caused a very serious
breach between her and her immediate supervisor. The company could not have avoided that,
because it had no prior warning she would send such a letter. The company could reasonably
take the view that no future course of action by Chalmers would be likely to repair the breach
with her supervisor. For that reason, Chalmers was an unsuitable employee, and the employer did
not need to figure out whether future religious communications by her were capable of being
accommodated. The court does remark that had the company accommodated Chalmers, it might
have faced religious harassment claims by employees receiving her letters. Id. at 1021. As
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The crucial issue in Wilson was whether her proposed
accommodation would have involved undue hardship. Before I address
that concept as it applies to the facts of Wilson, we need to survey how
"undue hardship" has been understood and might be understood.
The Supreme Court has not demanded much in respect to undue
hardship. The Court addressed Title VII accommodation in Trans
World Airlines v. Hardison.76
Hardison had converted to the
Worldwide Church of God, whose members would not work on
Saturday. When he was shifted to a new building, Hardison had
insufficient seniority to avoid Saturday work. Trans World Airlines
(TWA) encouraged the union to work out some arrangement for him.
The union was unwilling to violate the seniority system. TWA would
not let Hardison work only four days, with the consequence that it
would have some work positions unmanned on Saturday or would have
to pay overtime wages. The Supreme Court said that TWA had taken
steps to reasonably accommodate Hardison, but that it would constitute
undue hardship for TWA to leave a position vacant on Saturday or to
pay overtime wages. 77 TWA could not be expected to breach its
78
employment contract with the union.
We can roughly distinguish among very slight inconvenience to the
employer, significant cost that is less than serious, and serious cost.
Although applying these general categories to specific circumstances is
not always simple, the Court's opinion in Hardison states that an
79
employer need not "bear more than a de minimis cost."
Hardison implies another point of some importance. The statutory
provision is cast in terms of hardship on the employer's business; the
Court assumes that it includes undue hardship on fellow workers. In
Hardison, TWA was not required to breach its seniority agreement with
80
the union.
Thomas Berg has noted, it is a difficult question whether such letters could be treated as
harassment, given free speech considerations, but I do not understand the employer to have relied
on this rationale, and I do not think it is central to the court's decision. Thomas C. Berg,
Religious Speech in the Workplace: Harassment or Protected Speech?, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 959, 984 (1999).
76. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
77. Id. at 77.
78. Id. at 79.
79. Id. at 65.
80. Title VII applies to unions as well as employers. If a collective bargaining agreement
insisted that an employer not make a required accommodation, the agreement would be illegal in
that respect. Thus, the fact that an agreement forbids an accommodation cannot itself be
conclusive. The Court may have supposed that maintaining standard seniority practices was of
enough value that breaching them would constitute undue hardship, even if an employer
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After Hardison, in Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, the
Supreme Court indicated that if the employer must make some
accommodation, he need only offer a reasonable accommodation, not
81
necessarily the precise accommodation that the worker seeks.
Philbrook wanted to take paid days of personal leave to observe
religious holy days. 82 In allowing unpaid leave, the employer had made
a reasonable accommodation that allowed Philbrook the time off he
needed; that was sufficient, whether or not his proposed accommodation
83
would have involved undue hardship.
A study by Karen Engle shows that judges have generally been very
resistant to claims of accommodation and hesitant to require employers
to deviate from neutral rules of general application. 84 A major
exception has been that courts have sustained claims not to join unions,
with a requirement that the equivalent of union dues be given to
85
charity.
Courts have continued to employ the Hardison standard of undue
hardship, although that case lies in some tension with other apparently
applicable legal standards. The most severe surface discontinuity exists
with respect to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),8 6
whose application to the federal government may be valid although the
Supreme Court has held the Act unconstitutional as it applies to states
and localities. 87 The Act declares that if the government imposes a

established the rules on his own. But the Court may also have concluded that an agreement
between management and labor increases the importance of adhering to procedures that have
been agreed to. A number of courts have given great weight to what collective bargaining
agreements say in concluding that an accommodation would involve undue hardship. See Mark
A. Spognardi & Staci L. Ketay, In the Lion's Den: Religious Accommodation and Harassment in
the Workplace, 25 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 7, 15-16 (2000). One may reasonably think that an
agreement with a union could increase the degree of hardship of an accommodation at odds with
the terms of the agreement. Particularly if one is thinking of what an employer should understand
that he should do, as contrasted with what a court might order, one could not expect the employer
to breach an agreement in doubtful instances. See, e.g., Getz v. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 802
F.2d 72, 74 (3d Cir. 1986).
81. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 68.
84. Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious Accommodation
Provisionto Redeem Title VII, 76 TEx. L. REV. 317, 392-406 (1997).
85. E.g., McDaniel v. Essex Int'l, Inc., 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978). For a discussion on the
sorts of circumstances in which courts have required accommodation, see Spognardi & Ketay,
supra note 80, at 13-19.
86. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-I to 2000bb-4 (1994),
amended by Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274,
§ 7, 114 Stat. 806 (2000).
87. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
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substantial burden on someone's exercise of religion, it may do so only
if it has a compelling interest that cannot be accomplished by less
restrictive means. This language applies to the government as employer
and appears to impose a test that is more demanding than that of Title
VII, 88 although legislative history suggests that RFRA was not intended
to affect accommodation under Title VII. 89 A similar test appeared to
apply under the Free Exercise Clause, prior to the Supreme Court's
1990 decision in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith. 90
Courts, largely untroubled by earlier free exercise jurisprudence or by
RFRA, have assumed that government agencies need to accommodate
no further than Title VII requires. 9' The compelling interest test in free
exercise exemption cases has never been as stringent as the compelling
interest test in equal protection and free speech cases. That is as it
should be. Still, that test has been more stringent than the Title VII
accommodation test that has been developed.
I believe too little has been required of employers under Title VII. A
more appropriate standard would be that incorporated into a bill called
the Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 1999.92 It defined "undue
hardship" as an "accommodation requiring significant difficulty or
expense." 93 Among factors to be considered would be the cost of the
accommodation, the cost of lost productivity, and the cost of retraining,
hiring, or transferring 94other employees, in relation to the employer's
size and operating cost.
My conclusion that Title VII, as interpreted, demands too little
depends on judgments about the limited reach of the Establishment
88. However, avoiding violations under the Establishment Clause is one compelling interest.
If, in fact, a government employer's sustaining anything more than "de minimis" cost would
violate the Establishment Clause, the government would have a compelling reason not to
accommodate.
89. See Vikram David Amar, State RFRAs and the Workplace, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 513,
526 n.52 (1999); Sidney A. Rosenzweig. Comment, Restoring Religious Freedom to the
Workplace: Title VII, RFRA and Religious Accommodation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2513, 2526-27
(1996). Rosenzweig points out that RFRA could affect an employer's use of a collective
bargaining agreement or a statutory requirement as a defense to an accommodation claim, even if
it does not alter the basic "de minimis" standard. Id. at 2527-28, 2533-35.
90. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
91. This puzzle is explored in Amar, supra note 89, at 521-24, who remarks on "the judicial
carelessness that characterizes much of the religion case law." Id. at 523.
92. See Spognardi & Ketay, supra note 80, at 23.
93. Id. (discussing the Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 1999).
94. Id. The Act also limits the extent to which a seniority system provides a defense against a
claim for accommodation. Id. Similar bills had been introduced in previous sessions of
Congress.
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Clause and about permissible accommodation to religion under the
Constitution. The Supreme Court left open in Hardison whether even
the imposition of minimal cost would violate the Establishment Clause.
The basic argument against such accommodation is this: if the
government favors religion, it violates the Establishment Clause.
Enough cases have been decided since Hardison to give us reasonable
assurance that requiring minimal cost accommodation is constitutionally
permissible. But, that conclusion leaves open the issue of whether
requiring more costly accommodations might violate the Establishment
Clause. Were it to do so, any tension between Title VII and RFRA
would be neatly resolved. RFRA allows impairment of religious
exercise if the government is serving a compelling interest. Avoiding
Establishment Clause violations is undoubtedly a compelling interest.
If the imposition of more than minimal cost violates the Establishment
Clause, RFRA does not require any accommodation that goes beyond
minimal cost.
The subject of constitutional accommodation to religion is
complicated,9 5 but I assume that the government as an employer is
permitted to engage in more than minimal cost accommodation.
Supreme Court opinions presuming that legislatures may make choices
to accommodate religion have never suggested that when laws lift
burdens on religion they may impose no more than de minimis costs on
the government.
The more difficult question is whether laws may similarly impose
costs beyond minimal ones on private entities, including private
employers. Some opinions may be understood as suggesting that an
accommodation to religion is acceptable only when the government lifts
burdens that the government itself has imposed.9 6 On this view, a
legislature could decide to grant an exemption from criminal laws
against using peyote for groups that use that substance in worship
services, but it could not require that private universities allow students
97
to use peyote in worship services.
One might believe that the government has no business adjusting
burdens connected with religion within the private sector, thereby
imposing on private employers. Indeed, the Court did strike down a

95. My own view of some of the complexities is in Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status
and Prospectsof "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 380-88.
96. See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to
the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 712 (1992).
97. It could not, barring some argument that public laws against peyote underlie the
universities' restrictions.
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Connecticut scheme that required employers to grant workers their
Sabbath off. 98 That scheme, the Court believed, imposed absolutely and
unreasonably on private employers.
If government cannot accommodate by imposing burdens on private
employers, how can even the minimal accommodation requirements
under Title VII be justified? I shall examine one standard response, and
then provide a more satisfactory answer. The standard justification is
that Title VII is an anti-discrimination law, and the government can
require accommodation as an aspect of forbidding religious
discrimination. In the Connecticut case, Justice O'Connor commented
on its implications for accommodation under Title VII. She wrote that
"a statute outlawing employment discrimination ... has the valid
secular purpose of assuring employment opportunity to all groups in our
No doubt some failures to provide
pluralistic society." 99
accommodations could be so egregious one might easily consider them
to constitute outright discrimination-an intentional, or at least highly
reckless, disregard for someone else's religious faith and practice. Such
failures to accommodate would thwart equal opportunity. But the
language of Title VII goes beyond failures to accommodate that can
easily be labeled discriminatory; it may go beyond failures to
accommodate that interfere with equal opportunity. And Title VII
requires more accommodation of religious practices than it does of
practices strongly connected with race, gender, or national origin.'l° I
98. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
99. Id. at 712 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
100. However, accommodation for mental and physical disabilities, under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), has gone beyond that required for religion. See Jamar, supra note 10. at
800-01.
Although some relevant provisions of the ADA are similar linguistically to Title VII, for
example, requiring employers to make a "reasonable accommodation," 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)
(1994), unless this imposes "undue hardship," id. § 12111(10), makes the defense much harder to
assert. Whereas the Supreme Court in Hardison equates more than a de minimis cost with undue
hardship under Title VII. that approach is expressly rejected in the legislative history for the
ADA. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 40 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 463.
And the ADA itself defines "undue hardship" as actions requiring "significant difficulty or
expense" in light of several factors including, but not limited to, (1)"the nature and cost of the
accommodation," (2) the type of operations of the covered entity, (3) the number of employees of
the entity, and, most importantly, (4) "the overall financial resources of the facility." 42 U.S.C. §
12111 (10). Accordingly, if the cost of an accommodation, although a large sum, constitutes only
a small fraction of the covered entity's entire budget, the employer cannot claim undue hardship
on that ground alone. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 41 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 464. Additionally, the history specifically rejects a proposed "safe harbor"
provision that costs in excess of ten percent of an individual's salary would, as a matter of law,
constitute an undue hardship. Id. Rather, what constitutes "undue hardship" under the ADA
must be determined on a "case-by-case analysis" that carefully analyzes the factors provided in
§ 12111(10) (emphasis added). Olmstead v. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 606 n.16 (1999); S. REP. No.
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do not believe the language of Title VII's accommodation section, or
even that section's stingy application by the Supreme Court, can be
justified as a simple anti-discrimination law. The law requires
accommodation that extends somewhat beyond an absence of
discrimination.
For me, this leaves the question of whether legislatures can impose at
all on private citizens in requiring accommodation, beyond protecting
against discrimination. I do not see why not. Many impairments of
fundamental liberties can come from the private sector and private
employers enjoy the success they do from a fabric of supporting laws
and government practices. So long as the federal government otherwise
has jurisdiction to regulate behavior, say under the Commerce Clause,
the protection of religious liberty should be a permissible aim of
regulation.1 '' State legislatures, under their general police powers,
should have a similar ability to regulate private enterprises. If
governments can require some private accommodations to the religions

101-116, at 32 (1990). A court's determination of undue hardship under the ADA is not subject
to hard and fast rules; nevertheless, unlike accommodation under Title VII, the clear tenor of the
ADA's provisions, when read in light of the legislative history, is that an employer may be
expected to incur more than just a de minimis cost in order to fulfill his duty under the Act.
The case law, albeit sparse, bears out this approach and indicates that employers must take
fairly substantial steps to accommodate disabled employees in order to avoid liability. See, e.g.,
Harmer v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 831 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D. Va. 1993) (providing fans, smokeless
ashtrays, and air purifiers, while separating smokers from nonsmokers in the workplace, for
employee with pulmonary disability held "reasonable"); Davis v. York Int'l, Inc., 2 A.D. Cases
(BNA) 1810 (D. Md. 1993) (installing extra phone line and computer at home, while lessening
work responsibilities for employee with multiple sclerosis held "reasonable"); Bombrys v. City of
Toledo, 849 F. Supp. 1210 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (excluding insulin-dependent diabetic from police
force held "unreasonable" where providing food, glucose, and injection kit in patrol car would not
be an "undue hardship"). At the other end of the spectrum, accommodation costs that are "clearly
disproportionate" to the benefits produced, or costs that would jeopardize the financial stability of
the employer are "undue." Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir.
1995). See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can
Employment DiscriminationLaw Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L.
REV. 307, 320-40 (2001) (reviewing attempts by the Supreme Court "to define defensible and
administrable boundaries for disability accommodation claims"); Lawrence P. Postol & David D.
Kadue, An Employer's Guide to the Americans with Disabilities Act: From Job Qualifications to
Reasonable Accommodations, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 693, 712-18 (1991) (describing different
methods for employers to make reasonable accommodations); Sue Krenek, Note, Beyond
Reasonable Accommodation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1969, 1986-88 (1993) (analyzing the reasonable
accommodation standard set forth in the ADA).
101. I am, to be clear, not suggesting that the First or Fourteenth Amendment confers such
regulatory power on the federal government; I am assuming they concern only interferences with
rights that come from the government itself. I am also assuming that neither the Establishment
Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause bar all protections of religious exercise against private
actors.
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of private workers, they should be able to require a greater
accommodation than what Hardisondemands.
This brings us back to the Wilson case. 0 2 The court's result in that
case was correct whether one applies the Supreme Court's relaxed
standard of undue hardship or a more demanding, and more appropriate,
standard.
If the cause of disturbance had been the substance of the antiabortion message, U.S. West should have had to accommodate. If
religious messages and messages motivated by religious conviction are
to be accommodated, the need for accommodation should usually not
depend on the congeniality of the message for co-workers.'0 3 But the
sticking point with Wilson's button was the photograph.
Some photos are deeply disturbing: an anti-alcohol button might
show a vomiting drunk, or an anti-war button might show a row of
corpses or a family being burned by napalm. Workers who sympathize
with the basic message could be put off, even deeply troubled. We need
to see such photographs from time to time, but we do not want or need
constant exposure to them at work. Whatever their success in achieving
it, most people want a comfortable working environment and they are
more productive when they get it.
For the sake of his workers' serenity and productivity, an employer is
justified in forbidding deeply disturbing photographs from the common
working environment. The evidence suggested that Wilson's photo was
one of these, that other workers were deeply disturbed, that productivity
declined, and that some workers were inclined to stay home if Ms.
Wilson continued to wear the button.1°4 The option of counseling
workers to ignore the photo disregards human psychology. People do
not easily avert their eyes when a horrible sight comes within range, and
it would have been very difficult to look at Wilson without seeing the

102. See supra notes 60-74 and accompanying text (describing the context and analysis of
Wilson v. West Communications, 58 F.3d 1337 (8th Cir. 1995)).
103. However, an employer should be able to say sometimes that certain kinds of messages
are so fraught with controversy that speech about those subjects will not be tolerated at work. If
an employer makes such a decision, banning, for example, all electoral buttons at work, he should
not have to make an exception for non-religious electoral buttons, whose wearing happens to be
motivated by religious conviction. Some other messages may be so outrageous in general
opinion, for example, that parents should have the discretion to kill any child of theirs until the
child is one-year old, that an employer who bans them would not need to make an exception for a
religiously motivated statement of this sort.
104. Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1339.
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photo. The main accommodation that Wilson offered did involve undue
05
hardship. 1
The Townley case presented a difficult question about
accommodation. 1 6 Townley Co., you will remember, required all
employees to attend religious meetings. Pelvas, an atheist, asked to be
excused. Of course, if mandatory religious meetings are discriminatory
in themselves or constitute harassment against a worker of a different
religion, the objecting worker cannot be expected to attend. But if the
meetings do not constitute simple discrimination and do not make a
worker feel he is in a hostile environment, should an exemption be
granted to someone whose religious convictions make attendance
objectionable? 107
Pelvas's supervisor said he could read or sleep, and could wear ear
plugs during the services, but would not be excused.
The
accommodation issue was critical because the court (mistakenly in my
view) decided that mandatory services did not in themselves
discriminate against those who did not share the religious perspective of
10 8
the services.
The court concluded that Townley Co. had made no effort to
accommodate Pelvas's objections to the services, and that the central
question was whether excusing Pelvas would have caused "undue
hardship." 1°9 The court acknowledged the possibility of "spiritual
costs," but said that the statute requires connecting spiritual costs to an
adverse impact on the conduct of business, involving disruption of work
105. The district court reached this conclusion. The court of appeals, having found
(mistakenly in my view) that U.S. West offered a reasonable accommodation, did not have to
consider the issue of undue hardship; but it remarked that "the district court did not err" in
reaching its conclusion on that score. Id. Some scholars believe Wilson was wrongly decided.
See, e.g., Theresa M. Beiner & John M. A. DiPippa, Hostile Environments and the Religious
Employee, 19 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L.J. 577, 602-08 (1997); Berg, supra note 75, at 978-83. I
am not sure how far my difference with them depends on a conflicting appraisal of the degree of
unavoidable disturbance, rather than a different sense of how costly a required accommodation
might be.
I should note that I do not regard this as like a situation in which customers, or co-workers, are
directly disturbed by a worker's race, gender, or religion. I assume that any concession to such
feelings violates the statute.
106. EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1988).
107. This sentence assumes that someone might have an objection in conscience to attending
without necessarily feeling that forced attendance creates a hostile environment. This conjunction
of attitudes might be rare, but it is conceivable. The accommodation issue becomes obviously
more central if it is assumed either that the employer's non-selectiveness about audience or his
free exercise interests entail that the meetings do not amount to ordinary discrimination or
religious harassment.
108. Townley, 859 F.2d at 615.
109. Id. at 615-16.
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routine or imposition on co-workers. 10 By these standards, excusingI
Pelvas from the meetings would not have caused undue hardship." '
Because Townley Co. did not qualify for a special exemption created
2
for religious institutions, it had to excuse Pelvas from the meetings."1
John Noonan, a prominent scholar and judge, dissented. 1 3 He
thought the supervisor's proposal that Pelvas-could wear earplugs and
read or sleep was an offer of a reasonable accommodation. 114 Judge
Noonan also believed that Townley Co. should be allowed
to reject any
5
sharp dichotomy between secular and religious activity."l
All the judges agreed on a point that deserves brief reiteration here.
Whatever may be the status of atheism under the Free Exercise Clause,
atheists can make claims under Title VII. Not only can an atheist suffer
outright discrimination because of his religious belief that no God
exists, an atheist may need accommodation. The statutory language
requires accommodation of religious "belief' as well as "observance
and practice." 16 Although typical atheists have no observances and
practices of the sort meant, they undoubtedly have beliefs about religion
which may lead them to feel deep offense if they are consistently forced
to listen to religious doctrines they reject.' 17
Once that is conceded, Pelvas has the better of the argument on
accommodation. What Townley Co. offered was not a reasonable
accommodation, and the accommodation of excusing Pelvas did not
impose undue hardship. Pelvas finds it unpalatable to sit through
religious services of a faith he rejects. Is it an adequate answer that he
can wear earplugs and read newspapers? I think not. Few earplugs
keep out all noise, and, even if they did, forced attendance could feel
objectionable. Earplugs and newspapers should not be regarded as a

110. Id. at 615.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 616. Because the case was decided in 1988. two years before Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources v.Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the court considered
the employer's free exercise claim under the old approach of Sherbert v.Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963). It said the impact on the owner's religious practices of excusing those with religious
objections would not be great, and that the government's interest in ending religious
discrimination was a strong one. Townley, 859 F.2d at 616.
113. Townley, 859 F.2d at 662 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
114. Id. (Noonan, J.. dissenting).
115. id. (Noonan, J. dissenting).
116. Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1994).
117. Thus, one should not conclude that, "tf]or committed atheists, prayer is a silly waste of
time." Gregory, supra note 42, at 140. Compulsory prayer may strike an atheist as a waste of
time, but it may also be offensive to her conscience.
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reasonable accommodation to an atheist's sense that he should not have
to attend.
The employer must accommodate Pelvas unless to do so would cause
"undue hardship." Here, perceiving even de minimis costs is hard. 118
The employer should be able to point to some positive difference that
the presence of someone sitting with a newspaper and earplugs will
make. Common experience is that having participants who are
indifferent and inattentive, and are seen to be so by everyone present, is
more destructive of fruitful meetings than having the same persons
absent." 9 Even if the court mistakenly underrates the significance of
"spiritual costs," how could completely inattentive presence be better
than non-attendance? 120 Judges could reach the conclusion that
inattentive presence may be preferred only if they determine that an
employer may say what counts as spiritual costs, and that judges cannot
evaluate these. Without a doubt, the idea of courts evaluating spiritual
costs is troublesome, but if courts simply accept all assertions of
spiritual cost that are not evidently insincere, the result would be to
eliminate the accommodation benefit for workers when employers offer

118. I adopt the court's supposition that the amount of business discussion carried on at these
meetings was not in itself sufficient to require Pelvas's presence or to make the meetings other
than worship services.
In 1992, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered a worker's claim that her
employer had improperly conditioned her employment on continuing to attend a week-long
seminar in which Scriptural references were used to reinforce teachings, and a video presentation
indicated that wives should be subordinate to husbands. Kolodziej v. Smith, 588 N.E.2d 634
(Mass. 1992). Plaintiff had failed to make a Title VII claim, so the court was limited to deciding
whether the employer had interfered with her state "constitutional right to believe and profess the
religious doctrine of her choice." Id. at 637. (A state statute forbade private interference with
constitutional rights. The quote in the text represents the court's paraphrase of the right of free
exercise.) Plaintiff argued that both the view taught at the seminar, that husbands have authority
over wives, and her competing view were religious. Id. Noting the difficulty of distinguishing
secular from religious beliefs, the court accepted this contention of the plaintiff; it followed that
she would have a right not to attend the seminar if it was a religious activity. Id. at 638. But the
court concluded that the seminar was not a religious activity. Id. Had the court directly faced
Title VII issues, it would have had to decide if her religious objection to participating in a seminar
would have entitled her to an accommodation of being excused. One guesses the court would
have said that the seminar, dealing with matters like interpersonal conflicts, bore sufficient
relation to legitimate business concerns of the employer so he would not have had to make that
accommodation.
119. If the supervisor had a rational basis for his compromise, it may have been that few
employees would have the gall to be so openly disrespectful; whereas, more employees might
seek to be excused.
120. The employer might respond that he just wants to force people to be there to hear the true
word, but this aim, if achieved, constitutes religious discrimination against those who object.
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their own competing claims of religious exercise.
does not go down that road. 121

The court, rightly,

V. HARASSMENT: SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES
Before we tackle troublesome questions about religious harassment in
employment, we need a sense of basic harassment law as developed by
the Supreme Court.
As I have mentioned, religious harassment could result from quid pro
quo threats (or offers) that a worker's employment status will depend on
her religious affirmations or activities; more commonly, harassment
because of religion involves other conduct that is so "severe or
pervasive" it creates an atmosphere at work that is so hostile that one
22
can say it alters the terms or conditions of employment.
Title VII addresses only employers and unions, it does not directly
regulate the activities of fellow workers. 123 Thus, the hostile remarks
and other activities of fellow workers become actionable harassment
under Title VII only when they can be attributed to the employer. If
someone in a supervisory position makes an employment decision that
discriminates against a worker, say he fires a worker because she is
Jewish, he is taken to act for the employer. If workers continually make
remarks that are offensive to a co-worker, the employer's liability arises
only when the employer knows or should know what is happening and
fails to take adequate steps to stop the abuse.
In 1998, the Supreme Court addressed the responsibility of employers
for harassing behavior of supervisors that does not involve a tangible
employment action, such as a firing or a demotion. 124 To oversimplify,
the Court had to decide whether an employer is liable only for his
negligence or is vicariously liable for the actions of the supervisors he
employs. Drawing from the general law of agency and the policies of
Title VII, the Court held that the employer is vicariously liable, but that
he has an affirmative defense if he exercised reasonable care to prevent
and correct harassing behavior and if the plaintiff unreasonably failed to
take advantage of preventive or corrective opportunities. 125 In its
121. 1 do not address here the serious question of whether some employers in ordinary
businesses may be so religious they should have the rights to discriminate on religious grounds of
religious organizations. I presently believe that such an extension of those rights would be a
mistake, but that approach would be preferable to acceptance of all claims about spiritual costs.
See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
122. Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998).
123. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
124. Id. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16j; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
125. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher,524 U.S. at 807.
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approach, the Court declined to draw as sharp a distinction between
quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment as earlier cases had
suggested. Behavior by a supervisor that might amount to an unfilled
quid pro quo threat was treated as raising hostile environment issues,
26
not as constituting a tangible employment action. 1
At an initial glance, this treatment of unfulfilled supervisor threats
seems incongruous with the employer's liability for simple
discrimination by a supervisor. If the employer, despite energetic
efforts to stop discrimination, is liable for a supervisor's firing of a
worker because of her religion, why should a supervisor's quid pro quo
threats be treated differently? Quid pro quo threats made by those with
power to affect a worker's opportunities already discriminate, because
they strongly encourage the worker to act in the way that will cause the
discriminating result. If the worker submits to a sexual act or reforms
her apparent religion in order to receive a promotion she otherwise
deserves, she has suffered a wrong. When a supervisor has the ability to
cause the discriminating result, his serious quid pro quo threat itself
alters the worker's terms of employment; and that should lead to the
employer's liability, on the same theory that a supervisor's act of firing
or demotion would be attributed to the employer.
Despite the logic of this analysis, the Court's approach is at least
defensible. Many remarks suggest that a quid pro quo threat may be
less than explicit or not obviously serious. For administrative bodies
and courts, discerning the exact content of asserted threats and their
degree of seriousness is elusive. Further, workers should be encouraged
to go over the heads of abusive supervisors. The Court leaves open
whether a single serious threat could itself "constitute discrimination in
the terms or conditions of employment."' 127 Taking all this into account,
the Court's refusal to conclude that all quid pro quo remarks by
supervisors should be attributed to employers represents one reasonable
approach.

126. Part of the Court's concern was the difficulty of drawing the line between quid pro quo
and other harassment, and the incentive that line created for the plaintiffs lawyers to characterize
comments as quid pro quo. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752-53.
127. Id. at 754. Berg is critical of the Court's treatment of unfulfilled quid pro quo threats, but
suggests that a single serious threat might be sufficient to create a hostile environment. Berg,
supra note 75, at 968-69. Were the Court so to hold, the practical effect of Ellerth for supervisor
threats might be slight, but its conceptual approach would remain less than satisfactory. To make
out a hostile environment claim a plaintiff must establish that she felt the work atmosphere was
seriously hostile. One can advance a straightforward claim of discrimination without assertion
about one's subjective feelings, In theory, a worker might yield to some quid pro quo threat
without feeling the work environment was seriously hostile.
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Under Title VII, abusive remarks about a worker's religious
identification are like similar remarks about race or gender. In an early
case, a supervisor referred to a worker as "the Jew-boy," "the kike,"
"the Christ-killer," and the "God-damn Jew."' 128 Such abusive remarks
spring from a hostile animus, and they are indisputably unwelcome to
the listener. Treating them as the basis for a harassment claim presents
no serious issue. 129 The same is true if the abusive speech (or other
conduct) does not refer to the plaintiff's religion, but is designed to
offend her and is a response to her religious convictions. In one state
case, co-workers made salacious comments about a worker's wife, after
he had expressed a religiously based objection to their crude sexual
talk.' 30 In an another case, co-workers rubbed their genitals in a
worker's presence because they knew that, as a religious person, he
31
found that behavior offensive.'
The main complications about religious harassment arise over the
communication of serious ideas. Remarks may be highly critical of a
worker's religion without being intended to be personally abusive-"I
like you a lot. I am very sorry you are a Roman Catholic. The Pope is
the Antichrist and all Catholics who do not convert are doomed to
Hell." Although the speaker does not mean to be abusive, the listener
may perceive such comments as putting her in a second class or inferior
status.132 A somewhat different kind of problem involves proselytizing
that is not directly critical of anyone's religion, but is so persistent it
becomes deeply unsettling. Such remarks, if pervasive enough, can
create a hostile work environment.
Disturbing theological assertions and insistent proselytizing raise
special problems of hostile environment harassment that is based on
religion. Free speech problems can arise with harassment based on
gender, race, and national origin. But with religion, much more than
with these other categories, the speech that a listener finds deeply
offensive is offered out of the speaker's most sacred responsibilities and
128. Compton v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
129. One might have a very expansive notion of speech the First Amendment protects that
would cover such remarks in the working context, but one would then object to virtually any
notion of hostile environment harassment based on speech.
130. Finnemore v. Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 645 A.2d 15 (Me. 1994); see also supra note 33
(describing the facts and holding of Finnemore).
131. Golden v. G.B. Goldman Paper Co., No. 91-3162, 1991 WL 157385 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8,
1991).
132. I was struck at a conference on the place of religion in public life by a Jewish writer's
intense feeling that remarks that Jews cannot be saved (unless they convert) demeaned her and
other Jews. Awareness that the typical theological position of those making the statements is that
no one except Christians (in their sense of Christians) can be saved did not assuage the feelings.
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his concern for his listener's welfare. Further, the speaker may himself
have a statutory accommodation claim under Title VII. His speech is
not only speech, but a religious practice that may warrant
accommodation. Thus, the listener's claim not to be harassed, or to be
accommodated by being relieved of the speech to which he objects, may
be countered by a speaker's claim of rights to express his views. Trying
to sort out these threads is a major challenge. And I shall turn to it
shortly. But, first we need to have a sense of just what counts as
"religious" under the statute.
VI. WHAT IS RELIGION FOR PURPOSES OF TITLE

VII?

The question of what counts as "religious" under Title VII arises for
ordinary discrimination, accommodation, and harassment; but the
difficulties are most complex in respect to hostile environment
harassment based on disturbing speech. We have already examined
what relations of speaker's selection of audience, content of speech, and
nature of listener's offense are needed for an employer to discriminate
or harass because of a worker's religion. We have also examined
whether adverse treatment grounded in a moral judgment about ordinary
behavior amounts to religious discrimination if the basis for the moral
judgment lies in religious conviction. Here I consider the question of
what practices and beliefs are religious.
This question has mainly come up under the accommodation
provision of Title VII. Before Hardison was decided, the question
seemed to have considerable practical significance. It matters less now
because the employer's burden is so slight, even when the belief or
practice that the worker wants accommodated is religious.
Prior to 1980, courts split over what kinds of claims employers had to
accommodate. 13 3 Some assumed that claims had to be based on
institutional religion and that observance had to fit the accepted tenets
of that faith. Others, drawing on United States v. Seeger 134 and Welsh v.
United States,135 cases construing the statutory exemption from military
duty for conscientious objectors, ruled that sincerely held beliefs that
136
were religious within one's own "scheme of things" were sufficient.

133.
134.
135.
136.

See Engle, supra note 84, at 373-81.
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
Seeger, 380 U.S. at185.
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In 1980, the EEOC issued Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Religion 137 that decisively adopted the broader view of what counts as
religious. The introduction says:
The Guidelines do not confine the definition of religious practices to
theistic concepts or to traditional religious beliefs. The definition also
includes moral and ethical beliefs. Under the Guidelines, a belief is
religious not because a religious group professes that belief, but
because the individual sincerely holds that belief with the strength of
traditional religious views. 138
Under this interpretation, religion in Title VII is treated as is religion
under the Selective Service Act, according to the Seeger and Welsh
cases.
The EEOC approach may appear liberal and enlightened, but it is
troubling in some important respects. The first concerns what amounts
to a qualifying moral or ethical belief. What I have in mind particularly
is whether a worker must have a conscientious belief that he cannot, or
must, perform a particular action, or whether a strong sense of ethical
responsibility is enough for a belief to be like a traditional religious one.
In one Supreme Court case on unemployment compensation, a religious
pacifist refused to work on armaments. 139 A non-religious pacifist
might take a similar stance and seek a transfer to another department. If
the accommodation could be accomplished easily, the employer would
have to make it under the EEOC Guidelines.
But what of a strong ethical sense that does not amount to a
conscientious objection? A worker, required often to travel, feels a
powerful responsibility to spend time with her family. She requests "an
accommodation" of being shifted to another department whose workers
need not travel. Is the statute relevant here? Virtually every request
based on family needs is an ethical one in a broad sense. Treating as
"religious" all requests based on a strong ethical sense would make the
statute potentially applicable in too many instances and would make
administrative and judicial decision extremely difficult. The practical
concern about this consequence would increase greatly if the Hardison
duty to accommodate were made more demanding.
Another troubling aspect of the EEOC Guidelines concerns speech.
Probably few workers will make non-religious demands, in the
traditional sense, for special conditions at work such as having

137. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,610 (Oct. 31, 1980)
(codified as revised at 29 C.F.R. § 1605 (1996)).
138. Id.
139. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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Saturdays off or keeping a beard; but many workers may feel, as a
matter of conscience, that they should speak to co-workers on subjects
of concern. If a sense of ethical compulsion to speak qualifies for
accommodation under Title VII, much speech might be protected that is
neither explicitly religious nor motivated by a traditional religious
belief. Thus, someone whose overriding concern is saving the
environment might have a claim to have his environmental advocacy
accommodated.
This extension creates problems. If a worker wants to talk about
subjects of deep personal or public concern, is statutory protection to
depend on whether she feels conscientiously compelled to do so? That
would be a hard line to draw, and it would reward rigid ideologues (who
are likely to feel compelled) over people with more nuanced views of
life. If protection extended to all those who think their speech is highly
desirable from an ethical point of view, the standard would become
virtually unadministrable.
One's reaction to this possibility may depend somewhat on one's
attitude about an employer's present ability to respond to most speech
by workers. Perhaps workers should have general rights of free speech
vis-a-vis private employers, and a very broad notion of religious speech
could constitute a long step in that direction. But within a regime that
requires accommodation of religious speech, but not other speech, an
extension of religious speech to all speech demanded by conscience, or
to all speech recommended by an ethical sense, seems undesirable and
perhaps untenable. In any event, these broad implications of a
generously expansive view of religion seem not to have been
recognized by the EEOC. 140
The question of what counts as religion arises, as previously
indicated, in respect to harassment and ordinary discrimination, as well
as accommodation. I am not certain that the EEOC Guidelines were
designed to apply to ordinary discrimination and harassment, but that is
their apparent coverage. This application would create still further
difficulties.
Imagine that a recent college graduate decides to see what it would be
like to work in the logging industry. She quickly reveals to her logging

140. In Van Kuten v. Family Health Management, the court cited the EEOC Guidelines
approach approvingly, but discerned no evidence that the plaintiff had been fired because he held
"Wicca" beliefs or had expressed some of them in the workplace. Van Kuten v. Family Health
Mgmt., 955 F. Supp. 898, 902 (N.D. I11. 1997). In Seshardi v. Kasrain, without trying to
conceptualize the outer limits of protected beliefs, Chief Judge Posner made clear that religious
beliefs need not be orthodox. Seshardi v. Kasrain, 130 F.3d 798, 800 (7th Cir. 1997).
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companions that she thinks natural forests should be kept pristine. This
opinion proves to be politically incorrect within the logging community,
and supervisors and co-workers ridicule her for her environmental
views.
Must they try to figure out if environmentalism is a cause for which
she feels a religious-like commitment? If the graduate complains of her
abusive treatment, must the employer's representative decide on the
quality of her commitment, recognizing that the application of Title VII
will depend on it? When one considers harassment because of religion,
a very broad definition of religion renders the statute much too
amorphous. Such a broad definition is more strikingly mistaken for
harassment than it is for accommodation.
One can finally reject the EEOC approach only if one thinks there is
a preferable alternative. I am confident that more than one alternative
would be preferable. This is not the occasion to defend my own position
that courts should use an analogical approach to conceptualizing
religion, one that asks judges to start from the characteristics of
undoubted and paradigm instances of religion and to decide how closely
arguable instances of religion resemble these. 14 1 Under this approach,
many conscientious ethical stances and expressions do not count as
religious.
VII. RELIGIOUS SPEECH OF EMPLOYERS AND CO-WORKERS THAT
DISTURBS SOME WORKERS

It is time now to face the most daunting problem of Title VII
discrimination law as it pertains to religion. How should courts regard
the religiously based speech of employers and co-workers when that
speech proves disturbing to some workers? Ways in which the interest
in such speech could make a difference are illustrated by the Townley
case. 142
The majority in the court of appeals assumed that mandatory
religious meetings would constitute religious discrimination were that
problem analyzed apart from the employer's interest in religious
expression; but, in light of that interest, mandatory services did not
violate the Act.

141. See Kent Greenawalt, Five Questions About Religion Judges Are Afraid to Ask, in
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH 196, 206-24 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed.,
2000); Kent Greenawalt, The ConstitutionalConcept of Religion, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753 (1984).
142. See supra notes 34-43, 106-21 and accompanying text (discussing the legality and
concerns posed by mandatory religious meetings in the workplace).
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In dissenting from the court's conclusion that the company had to
accommodate Pelvas by excusing him (since the accommodation did
not involve "undue hardship"), Judge Noonan urged that the court had
paid insufficient attention to the employers' religious understanding of
their workplace, to their "spiritual costs. ' 143 Because Judge Noonan
regarded the supervisor's offer to Pelvas to use ear plugs and read a
newspaper during services as a reasonable accommodation, 144 we
cannot be certain what he would have said about undue hardship had he
disregarded the employers' claim to express their religious
understanding. But, given the failure of the employers to assert that
ordinary business needs required the attendance of every employee, we
can suppose that Judge Noonan would have concluded that excusing
Pelvas was not an undue hardship, absent the employers' spiritual costs.
Thus, what would not be an "undue hardship" could become one
because of the45 employers' interest in expressing their religious
understanding. 1
When fellow workers are involved, we can see easily that one
worker's interest in religious expression and his possible right to have
the expression accommodated, can come into conflict with the interest
other workers have in not being disturbed by religious messages that
make the environment hostile or in gaining the accommodation of being
free of messages at odds with their own religious understandings.
For both employers and fellow workers, we need to identify the
sources of protection of religious expression, to ask how the degree of
protection of religious expression should relate to the protection of nonreligious expression, and to inquire how conflicts with the interests of
unreceptive workers should be resolved. I shall begin with employer
speech and then turn to that of co-workers.
A. Religious Expression of Employers
As the mandatory meetings of Townley 146 show, employer expression
of religious views might constitute ordinary discrimination or
harassment, or it might give rise to a required accommodation. A
number of appellate courts have not permitted employers to engage in

143. EEOC v. Townley Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 624 (9th Cir. 1988) (Noonan, J.,
dissenting).
144. Id. at 622 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
145. I suspect Judge Noonan would also have viewed the reasonableness of the supervisor's
proposed accommodation differently if he had disregarded the employers' religious mission.
146. Townley, 859 F.2d at 610.
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religious expression to the degree that they chose, 147 and some
commentators have concluded that the judges are insufficiently
sympathetic with the employers' sense of religious mission. One has
remarked that "judicial intolerance 148has created an 'unjustified hostility
'
toward religion in the work place."
An employer may believe that his business should be tinctured to
varying degrees by religious practices. One employer may wish only to
send Christmas cards for the firm with an explicit message about the
birth of Christ. 149 Another may want his business to be deeply
reflective of religious precepts and practices, regarding his "secular"
company as a vehicle to live out a religious understanding in something
like the way the Salvation Army considers its charitable activities as a
way to embody and spread its religious understanding.
There is a substantial argument that an employer whose business
understanding is deeply religious should be able to engage in outright
religious discrimination, hiring only co-believers as supervisors and
requiring that ordinary workers be at least sympathetic with the
employer's religious mission. 150 A different section of Title VII allows
religious organizations to engage in religious discrimination, 15 1 and the
Supreme Court has said that this section does not violate the
Establishment Clause for nonprofit activities of religious organizations,
even in the permission it grants to
employers to discriminate for jobs
52
1
importance.
religious
no
that have
Should some ordinary businesses have a similar privilege if the
employers conceive of their missions as predominantly religious? The
argument in favor is that people should not lose their capacity to carry
out a religious vision simply because they want to do so in commercial
affairs. Most business employers have no such mission so job
And were such
opportunities overall would be little affected.
147. See. e.g., id. at 610; Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir.
1975); State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844 (Minn. 1985).
148. Brierton, supra note 15, at 290, 294-96, 303-05. Relatedly, two co-authors have
discerned a "preference for religious claims by non-religious employees over those of religious
employees." Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 105, at 580.
149. In Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v. Lesco Manufacturing & Design Co., the
employer wanted his worker to answer the telephone during the Christmas season with "Merry
Christmas." Ky. Comm'n on Human Rights v. Lesco Mfg. & Design Co., 736 S.W.2d 361 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1987). The worker was a Jehovah's Witness who believed in the principle that people
should not celebrate Christmas. Id. at 363.
150. See Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d at 844. Thomas Berg has a thoughtful
discussion of this possibility. Berg, supra note 75, at 1003-04.
151. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l (1994).
152. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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discrimination allowed, workers who themselves wish a religious
environment at work could find one.
I think that the line-drawing problems for such a privilege would be
too great. Large employers, such as major companies, should almost
certainly not have such a privilege, but legislative categorization by size
could not do all the work. Judges would have to say which employers
in the commercial marketplace are religious enough to qualify to
discriminate, and this would be an undesirable task to assign to courts.
Such businesses do not have a privilege under the present statute,' 53 and
extending the statutory privilege that now exists would be unadvisable.
Whether I am right or wrong about this, the rest of my discussion
assumes that commercial employers should not be able to engage in
outright, simple religious discrimination in hiring and promotions. It
assumes further that whether or not an employer's religious expression
should be protected should not depend on the degree of his religiosity.
Administrators and judges can inquire whether various forms of
expression are pretexts to harass or get rid of non-believers, but, once
they conclude that an employer has a sincere desire to express religious
views, they should not calibrate his degree of privilege to his degree of
religious commitment. In other words, mandatory services, and other
religious practices, should be treated the same for all employers who
have some sincere sense of a religious mission for their businesses.
The questions that remain are how far an employer's religious
expression should be protected and whether that protection should be
greater, lesser, or the same as the protection of other employer speech.
Among the sources of protection of an employer's religious speech is
the Free Speech Clause, which gives him the right to engage in a broad
range of expression. In general, the government cannot restrict the
speech of private individuals or companies unless it has a compelling
interest in doing so that cannot be served by less restrictive means. The
Free Exercise Clause covers religious expression as well as belief, but,
for the most part, it gives no more protection to religious expression
than does the Free Speech Clause.
Does the government's compelling interest in avoiding religious
discrimination mean that, in fact, religious speech by employers is
peculiarly unprotected (because the government can come up with a
compelling interest to suppress it)? Not exactly. We have seen that
non-religious speech, speech that is neither religious in content nor

153. The defendant in State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc. argued unsuccessfully to the
contrary. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d at 844.
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religiously motivated, could constitute religious harassment (if the
employer selects his audience on religious grounds). Non-religious
speech could also require an accommodation (if the speech offends a
worker's religious convictions or identity). Although religious speech
may be restricted more often than most non-religious speech, the
compelling interest that supports restraining some religious speech also
reaches some non-religious speech.
Someone might argue that if religious discrimination is forbidden, an
employer's religious speech should receive much less protection than
types of speech that have no connection to modes of forbidden
discrimination. Some speech favors racism and sexism or other "isms"
that are against public policy. Even if employers cannot themselves
engage in racism or sexism, their free public approval of these practices
may undermine to some extent their own adherence of nondiscriminatory behavior and may contribute to attitudes that lead to
discrimination.154 People are free in public to express beliefs that are
strongly at odds with public policy, but perhaps employers should not
be able in the workplace to try to persuade workers that norms of nondiscrimination are ill-founded. An analogous problem could easily arise
with religious speech that puts members of other religions down and
hints that their status in society should be diminished.
However, much religious speech differs from much racist and sexist
speech in this respect. Unless religious speech advocates religious
discrimination or explicitly or implicitly denigrates non-believers, a
positive message that certain religious beliefs and practices are true or
good need not be in tension with a norm of non-discrimination. An
employer can consistently say that hiring should not be based on
religious grounds, and that all people would benefit from recognizing
the truth of his particular religious view. Thus, we must be careful not
to conflate most religious speech with most racist and sexist speech in
resolving conflicts between an employer's free speech and his worker's
comfort. Further, whereas most racist and sexist speech reinforces
dominance of whites and males, 155 much, perhaps most, religious
speech in the American workplace does not reinforce some dominant

154. This could be the case, even though a person might accept a norm of non-discrimination
in employment and believe in some form of racism or sexism.
155. See J. M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295,
2308, 2315 (1999) (arguing that because employers control the workplace culture and because
they are able to prevent a hostile environment, vicarious liability for employee speech is
justified).
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religious perspective. 15 6 Thus, no good reason exists to disfavor much
religious speech as compared with other speech in which an employer
might engage.
Two state harassment cases provide examples of an employer's
religious speech; they can help us examine the appropriate degree of
protection and to compare further religious speech with speech based on
other kinds of missions. In Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor & Industries,
the sole proprietor of a small painting business continually witnessed to
his Christian faith, encouraged his worker to go to church, and chastised
him for sinful activities. 157 The worker, after having been fired, said his
158
boss had engaged in religious harassment.
According to regulations of the Bureau of Labor and Industries,
harassment on the basis of religion includes verbal conduct of a
religious nature that creates a hostile or offensive working
environment. 159 The Oregon Supreme Court rightly determined that the
rule, in general, was appropriate and that it covered the circumstances of
the case. 160
In Brown Transport Corp. v. Commonwealth,16 1 a lower state court
indicated that Bible verses on paychecks and Christian religious content
in some articles in a company newsletter were sufficient to sustain a
finding of the Human Relations Commission that the employer had
harassed a Jewish worker. 162 Soffer, the worker, had testified that these
religious messages led him to worry about his job security and to

156. This assertion depends on two debatable classifications. I count proselytization by
evangelical Christians as not reflecting the dominant perspective among Christians. Such
proselytizing does, of course, reflect the dominant Christian religion as compared with nonChristian religions. I am also not considering narrow localities. In some locales, most workplace
religious speech may reinforce the religious view that predominates in that locale.
157. Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 903 P.2d. 351 (Or. 1995).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 355.
160. Id. at 357. According to the court, it did not matter that the employee had a lack of
religious beliefs: he was entitled to be protected against discrimination because he did not share
the employer's religious beliefs. Id. at 358. Considering the rule and its application under the
provisions of the Oregon Constitution dealing with free exercise, the court concluded that the
regulation could not be applied unless the employer was aware that his actions were having a
harmful effect. Id. at 362. This condition was not met in the case; Meltebeke's worker did not
tell him that the continual preaching disturbed him and Meltebeke did not realize it. Id. at 363.
Requiring that the employer know, or be told (he might be told but disbelieve), that his religious
proselyting is having such a negative effect is an appropriate condition on liability. See id.
161. Brown Transp. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 578 A.2d 555 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
162. id. at 562. One might characterize this conclusion as dictum. The court also concluded
that Soffer should have been accommodated, and that he was fired as a consequence of his
complaining about the paychecks and articles. Id.
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believe that a worker
would need to be Christian to be promoted into
63
upper management. 1
When an employer promotes a Christian message in these ways, a
non-Christian understandably is concerned about his job prospects. But
stopping the message is hardly the way to assure that the employer will
not discriminate in hiring and promotions.' 64 Should an employer
choose to engage in religious speech, he should state very clearly that
religious factors will not figure in employment decisions. But if such
fears about discriminatory actions, independent of actual hiring and
promotion decisions and independent of what the employer says about
his employment policies, are taken as enough to stop religious
messages, that would be too sharp a restriction of an employer's
religious speech. Employers would be able to convey all sorts of
controversial non-religious ideas (except racist, sexist, and xenophobic
ideas), but not religious ones. The court in Brown Transport was right
to conclude that a pattern of general messages to all workers could
amount to religious harassment, but the expressions in that case should
not have been taken as sufficient to cause a reasonable worker to feel
that the working environment was hostile or abusive. 165 Otherwise, any
66
employer's religious speech could be taken to have that effect. 1
Should an employer's religious speech and mission be treated
differently from other speech and missions? Let us imagine that the
employer has deeply felt opinions about important social issues: he
prints appeals to contribute to charities for the poor on his paychecks, or
he prints posters expressing approval of the country's involvement in a
war, or he requires employees to attend meetings at which they are

163. Id.
164. Perhaps we need to pause over this conclusion, if an employer has voluntary religious
meetings that most workers attend, and employment decisions are made by lower supervisors or
by groups of team members of equal status at those meetings, is it not possible that the attendees
will develop a bond that excludes those who do not attend? Their sense that the non-attendee is
an outsider may affect their evaluation; so also may their sense that the non-attendee is at odds
with the employer on religious matters, even though the employer has said that employment
decisions should not be made on the basis of religion. This worry is far from fanciful, but it
should not be enough to shut down an employer's religious expression. See Susan Sturm, Race,
Gender, and the Law in the Twenty-First Century Workplace: Some Preliminary Observations, I
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 639, 669-73 (1998).
165. By comparison, this was a much milder form of religious expression than mandatory
religious meetings, which the Townley court did not think were barred by Title VII. (Of course,
that court did not consider a claim of harassment, although an atheist's request for an
accommodation to be excused came close to an assertion that he felt harassed.)
166. Perhaps Soffer should have been entitled to some accommodation, such as getting a
special paycheck without the religious message, and Brown Transport may have been at fault for
firing Soffer because he complained; but the finding of harassment reached too far.
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informed of the shortage of local blood supplies and are urged to give
blood. Workers might object to these messages on various grounds, but
a religious pacifist might find the approval of war objectionable on
religious grounds, and a Jehovah's Witness, opposed by religious
conviction to blood transfusions, might object to being forced to listen
to a plea to give blood. When we think about such non-religious
speech, it is not easy to conclude that religious speech should be more
or less privileged. Employers should be free to join various causes or
missions to their commercial operations. One would not conclude that
they are specially privileged to pursue religious missions in a domain
where such missions are not common, but one would also not conclude
that they should be less privileged to pursue religious missions than
other missions. In the examples I have chosen, the other "missions"
may be more temporary than religious missions, but an employer could
have a long run aim to help the poor or protect the environment.
Various "non-business" missions should be accorded equal status by the
law.
The analysis, thus far, does not quite dispose of the mandatory
meeting problem. Rights of free speech rarely, if ever, give someone a
right to compel people to listen. Having religious meetings may be an
aspect of an employer's free speech, but compelling attendance as a
condition of employment involves using the employer's economic
power to coerce attention to religious messages. 167 We might conclude
that the Free Speech Clause gives the employer little or no protection
for making attendance compulsory. In that event, it could matter greatly
whether some special privilege arises for mandatory religious meetings.
Such a privilege might come from a constitutional right of free exercise,
from RFRA, or from the implications of Title VII.
The Townley case was decided in 1988 and the court there assumed,
under the then prevailing constitutional approach of Sherbert v.
Verner,16 8 that the government could not impair anyone's interest in
free exercise without showing a compelling interest. That particular
approach was apparently blocked by Employment Division, Department
of Human Resources v. Smith,169 which holds that religious claimants
have no constitutional privileges of exemption from valid general

167. Alternatively, one might say that compelling his workers to attend as a condition of
employment does involve the free speech of the employer, but that protection of that aspect of his
speech is not as great as protection of his right to express himself.
168. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
169. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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laws. 70 But RFRA, as I have indicated, probably applies to actions of
the federal government, including restrictions imposed under Title VII.
Thus, an employer can argue that the federal government cannot
substantially burden his religious practices without a compelling
interest. He might also argue that his own religious interests should be
taken into account whenever religious discrimination is considered.
That is to say, if Title VII is designed to protect religious freedom and
diversity, an employer's interest in religious exercise should figure in
what counts as discrimination by him.
The issue about mandatory religious meetings becomes difficult if
one takes account of the employer's religious exercise. However, we
know that an employer cannot refuse to hire workers because of their
religion, and a requirement that workers attend regular services of a
specific denomination would definitely be impermissible. I think
mandatory services, involving an employer's use of economic coercion,
are too close to required church attendance to be allowed. Title VII
itself does not help the employer; it is about equal employment and
worker's rights, not employer privileges. The language of RFRA is a
greater obstacle to my conclusion. 17 1 To avoid the compelling interest
analysis that RFRA involves and that the court employs in Townley, I
would say that an employer does not suffer a "substantial burden" on
his exercise of religion (the predicate for application of RFRA) if he is
not allowed to dictate to all his workers what religious services they
must attend.
B. Protecting the Religious Speech of Employees
As we have seen, the Title VII provision on accommodation gives
some protection to the religious speech of workers. Claims about
freedom to speak can also figure when other workers complain of
harassment. Does religious speech in this connection receive more
protection than other speech and, if so, is that defensible?
We need here to distinguish government from private employers.
Workers for private employers have limited free speech rights against
their employers, including speech that concerns the process of collective
bargaining or is safeguarded by agreements reached under collective
170. However, in states that continue to use a compelling interest approach for their state free
exercise clause, the constitutional privilege could be invoked against state statutes and
regulations.
171. However, courts have assumed that RFRA and the earlier free exercise compelling
interest clause require no greater accommodation to religious claims of workers than does Title
VII. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. A weak protection of worker claims to
religious expression would fit with a weak protection of employer expression.
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bargaining, and speech that informs others about illegal or wasteful
activity. 172 As far as federal law is concerned, an employer may fire a
worker because he does not like her expressed opinions about farm
subsidies or intervention in Kosovo.
Government workers have more extensive rights to free speech than
do private workers. 173 Government officials "enjoy wide latitude in
managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary"
when workers' speech does not relate to any "political, social, or other
concern" of the community. 174 However, worker communications
about matters of public concern and about how the workplace is
operating cannot be restricted unless the interest in speech is
outweighed by the government's interest "in promoting75the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees."1
Could one argue that religious speech is not of "public concern" in
the sense that the Supreme Court means? The Court has not addressed
this question, but religious speech (and other speech about general
ideas) should count as being of public concern, if any such line is to be
drawn. That the Free Exercise Clause protects religious expression, as
well as other religious practice, strongly supports this conclusion. To
restrict religious speech, the government must ordinarily make at least
the showing required when it restricts speech about job-related and
76
political concerns. 1
One might believe that the law accords more protection for the
religious speech of government workers than it does for non-religious
speech. The two relevant statutory provisions are the accommodation
section of Title VII1 77 and RFRA. 178 We have seen that the Supreme

172. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J.
101, 114-19 (1995).
173. See id. at 115-16.
174. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). In general, I do not think expression about
personal matters should be less protected than speech about broader concerns. See KENT
GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 44-46, 83-84 (1989).
175. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483
U.S. 378 (1987) (holding that a public employee's comment approving of an assassination
attempt on the President was speech on a matter of public concern and protected because the
comment did not disrupt the function of the public employer); Connick, 461 U.S. at 138 (holding
that an attorney's speech on office morale and office policy was not a matter of public concern
and therefore unprotected).
176. However, if the speech is thought to suggest a government endorsement of religion or is
regarded as harassing another worker, it can be restricted even though the reason would not be
well phrased as "promoting the efficiency of the public services." The government, of course,
unlike a private employer, cannot itself make theological assertions.
177. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 US.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
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Court has interpreted the accommodation section not to demand much
of employers. 179 If the government has sufficient reason to restrict
religious speech under the standard free speech test, it could refuse to
accommodate. According to RFRA, if the government places a
substantial burden on someone's free exercise, it must have a
compelling interest. 180 The language of this standard is more protective
of religious practice than either Title VII's accommodation provision or
the standard free speech test; but we have seen that courts, with support
from the Act's legislative history, have assumed that RFRA is not more
demanding than Title VII. 18 1 Insofar as we can summarize an unclear
existing law, religious speech of government workers enjoys the same
degree of protection as other speech about public concerns.
Some scholars have urged that religious speech should receive
special protection, that it is uniquely important or uniquely safeguarded
in our constitutional scheme, or both. 182 Much might be said about this,
but in recent decades the Supreme Court has generally assumed that
religious speech does not enjoy a special degree of protection under the
Constitution. I think this is the right approach, and it should be applied
183
to speech of government workers.
Rights of religious speech by government employees were sharply
raised by Brown v. Polk County.' 84 The Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals, en banc, considered the firing of a director of a county
department who had engaged in various religious activities with respect
to his workers. 185 Brown claimed religious (as well as racial)
discrimination. 186 The basic issue in the case turned out to be which
religious activities the county should have accepted and which it
178. Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb- Ito 2000bb-4 (1994),
amended by Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274,
§ 7, 114 Stat. 806 (2000).
179. See supra notes 60-121 and accompanying text (discussing how employers must make an
accommodation unless they can show that they would suffer "undue hardship").
180. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-I to 2000bb-4. Not all restrictions of religious speech would
constitute a substantial burden on someone's exercise of religion.
181. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing how courts have not required
any more accommodation than Title VII requires, even after the passage of RFRA).
182. See Betty L. Dunkum, Where to Draw the Line: Handling Religious Harassment Issues
in the Wake of the FailedEEOC Guidelines, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 989 (1996); Kimball
E. Gilmer & Jeffrey M. Anderson, Zero Tolerance for God?: Religious Expression in the
Workplace After Ellerth and Faragher, 42 HOW. L.J. 327, 344 (1999).
183. That is, I do not believe either Title VII or RFRA should be construed to give religious
speech a special degree of protection in this context.
184. Brown v. Polk County, 61 F.3d 650 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
185. id.
186. Id. at 653.
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reasonably had told Brown to stop.187 The court treated the case as one
involving required accommodation, with both constitutional and
statutory dimensions. 188 It said that the First Amendment protected at
least as much religious activity as did the accommodation section of
89
Title VII. 1
The court determined that Brown had properly been told not to direct
his secretary to type Bible study notes and not to have workers gather in
his office to say prayers before the start of the workday. 19° However,
the county had erred in forbidding Brown from having occasional
prayers and references to Christianity in his office during the workday
and in directing him to remove all items with a religious connotation
91
from his office.'
The county's instruction that Brown not have his secretary type notes
of Bible study involved no substantial interference with his religious
exercise. Brown had no right to open his office for prayers before the
working day because an employer need not open offices during that
period for non-working affairs. The court held that the county could
take the position that workspaces were meant for work, not the carrying
92
on of personal business. 1
This particular conclusion of the court is highly questionable. My
working experience, limited as it is but including three different jobs
with the federal government, is that one can go to one's office before
the working day begins and chat about trivia with co-workers if one
chooses. Whatever the county's formal policy, it strains credulity to
suppose that it would have reacted negatively if the meetings in
Brown's office had been about most other subjects. If, in fact, the
county would not have responded negatively to other kinds of regular
meetings on non-work subjects, a general policy of workspaces for
work should not have sustained this restriction.
The court decided that restricting Brown from having religious items
in his office and making occasional religious statements during the
working day did substantially interfere with his religious practices,
practices which did not significantly disturb co-workers. 193 Evidence
did not bear out any worry that Brown's religious communications

187. Id. at 655-56.
188. Id. at 654, 657-58.
189. Id. at 658.
190. Id. at 655-56.
191. Id. at 656-57, 659.
192. Id. at 656.
193. Id. at 656-57.
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might divide the office between Christians and non-Christians. Thus,
the county could have accommodated these aspects of Brown's
religious practice without undue hardship. Its failure to do so violated
both Title VII and the Free Exercise Clause. The court explicitly
analogized the case to ones involving non-religious speech by
government employees and saw "no essential
relevant differences"
94
between free speech and free exercise rights. 1
Four dissenters were concerned with the effect of Brown's activities
on workers beneath him.' 9 5 They believed that he had failed to show a
substantial interference with his religious exercise and that, in a balance
96
of interests, the county should have prevailed. 1
People can disagree about exactly which of Brown's activities should
have been protected, but the court undertook the right kind of inquiry,
assuming that public workers may communicate their religious opinions
unless the consequence is disruption of work or serious disturbance of
other employees. 19 7 It is critical, however, that if supervisors like
Brown are engaging in religious speech, they make clear that
advancement in the workplace does not depend on workers "going
along with their religious views."
In 1997, the Executive Branch issued the Guidelines on Religious
198
Exercise and Religious Expression in the Federal Workplace.
According to the Guidelines, individual federal workers are free to
express religious ideas unless it creates the appearance of government
endorsement, intrudes on the "efficient provision of public services," or
"intrudes upon the legitimate rights of other employees." 199 Religious
speech is to be treated like other speech, including ideological speech
on politics. 2° °

Supervisors, as well as workers, can express personal

religious views if they make clear they are personal views. 20
language, the Guidelines say:

1

In crucial

194. Id. at 658 (referring to Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)).
195. Id. at 660 (Fagg, J., dissenting).
196. Id. (Fagg, J., dissenting).
197. A different issue is religious speech that seems to represent the government itself. That
would be a critical concern for a school teacher or a chief executive. I am assuming that Brown
was not in a position for that to be a problem.
198. White House Office of the Press Secretary, Guidelines on Religious Exercise and
Religious Expression in the Federal Workplace (Aug. 14, 1997), reprinted in Stephen S. Kao, The
President's Guidelines on Religious Exercise and Religious Expression in the Federal
Workplace: A Restatement or Reinterpretation of Law?, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 251, 268-79

(1999).
199. Id. at 268.
200. Id. at 269.
201. Id. at 272-73.
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Employees are permitted to engage in religious expression directed at
fellow employees, and may even attempt to persuade fellow
employees of the correctness of their religious views, to the same
extent as those employees may engage in comparable speech not
involving religion ....

But employees must refrain from such

asks that it stop or otherwise
expression when a fellow employee
20 2
demonstrates that it is unwelcome.
In appraising the Guidelines, we need to understand that some people
are insistent about pressing their religious views onto others. On their
understanding, the speakers offer listeners a hope of salvation, and
nothing could be more important. Regrettably, these messages of help
are especially disturbing to many listeners. Some workers may be
cowed and disinclined to express their discomfort with such
expressions, particularly if they come from supervisors, even
supervisors who are careful to distinguish their personal views from
office responsibilities.
This reality creates the basis for an argument that religious speech
should be discouraged more than most other speech, but the approach of
the Guidelines is preferable. People should be told that they need not
listen to religious speech that is directed to them if they do not want to
hear it. If listeners feel harassed by it, they need to say so. This is not a
perfect balance of speaker's and listener's rights, but it is about the best
this subject allows.
The Guidelines have been criticized for being too vague and for not
20 3
adequately protecting the religious speech of government workers.
This subject permits only a certain degree of precision. No doubt,
particular formulations may be improved, but the general tenor of the
Guidelines is sound.
What of workers of private employers? The law does not afford them
broad protection against employers who freely choose to restrict their
speech. The accommodation section of Title VII safeguards some
religious speech. Is this special protection proper? I believe that other
speech should be protected along with religious speech, that laws should
forbid employment discrimination on the basis of any opinions workers
express that are not related to work and that do not disturb work
activities. However, in a legal regime in which worker speech, in
general, is not protected, safeguarding their religious speech is

202. Id. at 270.
203. Id. at 252. Kao also argues that the Guidelines exceed the President's authority in
covering employees not in the executive branch, and that their issuance improperly avoided
public scrutiny of their content. Id. at 252-53.
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appropriate as an aspect of forbidding religious discrimination and
protecting religious liberty.
A distinction between religious and other speech involves a form of
content discrimination, something that requires a substantial
justification if it is to pass constitutional muster. In general, principles
of free speech do not permit favoring some kinds of speech over others,
but the law already has well entrenched categories of protected worker
speech, including speech about collective bargaining and "whistle
blowing." 20 4 If the law is to combat discrimination on grounds of
religion and attempt to create equal opportunity for members of
different religions, religious speech needs protection. Part of the
problem is that an employer who really dislikes a worker's religion may
take the occasion of her religious speech to fire her. 20 5 Even if the
employer has no such view, but fires the worker because fellow workers
do not approve of her religious speech, permitting the firing detracts
from an equal opportunity workplace. Those with conventional
religious views and attitudes are unlikely to cause a stir, and religious
dissidents and strident evangelists will find their speech becoming the
occasion for unfavorable treatment. Under all these circumstances, this
degree of content discrimination is definitely appropriate.
The hardest problems about religious speech are created by the law of
religious harassment. If a worker's speech seriously disturbs coworkers, does that alter conclusions about what speech is protected?
I have said that the law does not broadly protect a worker who
engages in speech that disturbs an employer or her co-workers. But
when harassment, in the statutory sense, is at issue, the situation is
different. If an employer disciplines or fires a worker who engages in
religious harassment, he is doing so because the law, Title VII, tells him
he must. Once the government enters the picture, it cannot make a
statutory wrong out of speech protected by the First Amendment. Thus,
worker speech of all sorts, religious or not, has some claim not to be
treated as forbidden harassment. A worker's non-religious speech is
protected against government regulation by the Free Speech Clause; her
religious speech is similarly protected, but is also covered under the

204. See Estlund, supra note 172, at 116-19. Professor Estlund has suggested in conversation
that when the government protects certain kinds of speech from private interference, the usual
suspicion about content distinctions may be unwarranted.
205. I assume that were an employer to fire a worker because he disagrees with the content of
the worker's religious speech, that would be outright discrimination, illegal apart from any
requirement of accommodation.
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Free Exercise Clause, the accommodation provision of Title VII, and
RFRA.
As I have remarked about employer speech, the speech that disturbs
other workers because of their religion may or may not be religious
speech, and religious speech that disturbs workers may or may not do so
because of their religion. 20 6 The court in Wilson rightly considered her
religiously motivated wearing of an anti-abortion button as a form of
religious speech, but it said that the reasons why other workers were
disturbed did not have to do with their religious convictions. 20 7 When
co-workers engaged in crude sexual talk about a worker's wife, their
speech was not religious, but they were harassing him because of his
religion. 20 8 Although religious speech that offends does not perfectly
match with speech that offends because of religion, a significant
proportion of speech that offends because of religion will be religious
speech.
Speech that harasses because of religion may be dominantly abusive
and meant to humiliate a co-worker. This speech closely resembles
much racist and sexist speech and has little to recommend it. Even if
some implicit theological propositions may be lurking in the
background-some of those hurling epithets at Jews may suppose that
God has condemned them for their role in Christ's death 2°9-such
speech does not deserve protection in the workplace setting.210 I think
this is true even if a speaker is mainly addressing others, so long as she
is aware that those she abuses will be among her listeners.
The difficult problems arise when the speaker has a sincere religious
message but one that some workers find to be offensive. The general
principles should be those applicable to other serious speech by
workers. By "serious speech," I mean speech that sincerely expresses a
person's convictions in a non-abusive way, though I will not pause here
to defend an approach that gives such serious speech more protection
than overtly abusive speech or sexually salacious speech.

206. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (describing an example of religious
harassment where a woman is disturbed as a Catholic though the conversation was not religious).
207. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text (describing the reasons why the workers
were disturbed for personal reasons such as infertility or miscarriage).
208. See supra note 33 (describing a case in which a religious co-worker was subjected to
explicit comments because of his religion).
209. According to New Testament accounts, Jesus was put to death by the Romans, but with
the encouragement of some Jewish leaders.
210. For a contrary view by the scholar who has most powerfully defended the importance of
free speech protections in the workplace, see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace
Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791, 1812-14 (1992).
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With co-worker speech that is directed at an individual, the key to
religious speech, as well as other speech, is that the listener should be
able to stop unwanted speech. 2 11 The speaker may sincerely want to
save her listener, or she may wish to annoy him, but if the listener is
deeply offended, or highly annoyed, whether or not on religious
grounds, he should be able to prevent future speech of that sort that is
directed at him. Someone who has clearly indicated that he does not
wish to hear religious messages that offend his religious convictions
2 12
may be protected against such messages being directed at him.
Non-directed employee speech presents greater difficulties. Under
these circumstances, a worker engages in speech that is not directed at
any particular co-workers, as with Wilson's anti-abortion button, or she
speaks directly to co-workers who do not object and is overheard by
other workers who do object, or she directs her speech at a group of
workers only some of whom object. 2 13 The speaker is not seeking to
cause offense and is not aiming her remarks at those with particular
religious views, but what she says is predictably offensive to some who
see or hear.2 14
In general, workers should be free to display what they want in the
way of photographs and sayings in their own private work spaces, at

211. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDs 86-91 (1995); Berg, supra note 75, at
985-86; Volokh, supra note 210, at 1863-67.
212. I do not mean that the present law gives the worker the right to stop such speech if it is
not connected to a statutory category of discrimination. I mean only that the employer may
provide this protection and that if a law required the employer to do so, it would not violate the
First Amendment.
213. Another possibility is that although the speech is general, say a button or a flyer in a
general work space, the very aim of the speech is to reach people with religious views that vary
from those of the speaker. And a considerable percentage of those recipients do object. For
example, the workplace has eighty-eight Christian and twelve Jewish workers; someone posts a
notice by Jews for Jesus that is directed at the twelve Jews and is offensive to most of them. Such
speech is directed at that subgroup of workers, and if most of them object, it should be treated as
unwelcome speech, particularly if it is feasible to reach the Jews who do not object by some other
means.
Speech also counts as directed if it is made to a group, but the very aim is to irritate some
individual with particular religious views. Thus, three co-workers may use crude expressions in
their conversations just because they want to provoke a fourth whose religious beliefs make such
speech deeply offensive to him. Finnemore v. Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 645 A.2d 15 (Me. 1994).
214. Sometimes a distinction is made between "passive" religious speech, in which workers
may engage, and "hostile" speech, in which they may not engage. See Dunkum, supra note 182,
at 987-88. This distinction is helpful in emphasizing the difference between affirmations of one's
own religion, say by wearing religious jewelry, and attacks on other workers' religion; but the
terminology suggests a sharpness of division that the subject does not allow. Various factors can
pull what would otherwise be "passive" into the "hostile" category. See id. at 988.
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least if those workplaces are not areas to which others are constantly
exposed.
A different example involves speech to some people bound to be
overheard by others. Suppose five workers in a telephone repair crew
travel in a van together to and from jobs they must do. Four are
evangelical Christians who belong to the same church. The fifth is an
atheist. The four like to talk about their church, including occasionally,
their belief that those who are not born again are damned. The atheist is
offended by such talk and feels excluded, and he tells the other workers
this. Yet their conversation on this topic would be precisely the same
were he not there. By and large, people should have to tolerate
conversations they are bound to overhear. Even if the atheist's
objection is considered to relate to his religious views, the law should
not block free conversations that he cannot avoid overhearing.
However, workers should have to observe minimal standards of
politeness, not saying things of marginal importance that they know will
deeply upset people who cannot avoid overhearing them.2 15 When
speakers do not observe such standards, officials might infer that they
meant to direct their comments at the person who will be sure to be
offended, or officials might say that a failure to satisfy minimal
standards of politeness counts as directing their remarks, whatever the
actual intentions of the speakers.
Among the hardest issues about employee speech are those involving
common work areas. Some employees wish to speak in a way that
offends a proportion of their fellows. The speech is not directed
exclusively at those willing to hear, with some others overhearing (as in
the van example). Rather the speech is directed at all who share the
space, as with the anti-abortion button or a typical flyer on the bulletin
board.
Some who have written about workplace harassment have
emphasized that workers are "captives" in their workplace, unable to
avoid offending speech. The thrust of this argument is that people
should not be forced to endure speech they abhor. But it is also true that
speakers are captives during working hours. The only people to whom
215. I am, thus, suggesting a standard with two features: the predictable degree of upset and
the degree of centrality for the speaker of what he is saying. The four Christians in the van would
not, we may suppose, have a deep need to say continually that atheists are damned. But if the
atheist is highly upset by any talk about religious beliefs and practices, avoiding his upset could
cut off what his four co-workers most want to discuss. They should not be so restricted. Eugene
Volokh raises the question whether the law can distinguish "genuinely rude" behavior from "not
really rude" behavior. Eugene Volokh, Intermediate Questions of Religious Exemptions-A
Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 595, 647-48 (1999).
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they can communicate are fellow workers. 2 16 And communications
among co-workers are among the most important interchanges in a
society in which the workplace tends to be more diverse than most other
social groupings. 217 These are reasons in favor of freedom to
communicate.
The general resolution of these competing considerations is that
people should be allowed to communicate their sincere opinions in
common areas, but they may reasonably be restrained by conventions of
polite and respectful speech-not the conventions of a highly literate
class, but the conventions of those who are involved.2 18
A complicated problem is raised by communications which singly
may be constitutionally protected but which together create a seriously
hostile environment. To use an illustration of Thomas Berg's, one sign
that "Jesus Saves" may have little effect on non-Christians, but if such
2 19
signs were all over the workplace, the reaction may be different.
When comments that alone would be protected yield evidence about
unprotected behavior or add to the force of a significant amount of
unprotected behavior, I assume they may count in a finding of a hostile
environment. 220 But what if the main basis for finding a hostile
environment is individual acts of expression each of which would itself
be protected?
One cannot argue that since an employer by himself can freely
restrict the speech of workers, none of these individual acts of
expression warrants protection. Once the government prohibition
figures in the employer's response to expression, the Constitution is
involved.
The position most favorable to speech is that individually protected
acts cannot be cumulated into an unprotected combination, 221 but I
believe that approach is also mistaken. Whether acts are protected
depends partly on the strength of the government's interest in restriction
216. See GREENAWALT, supra note 211, at 86-87.
217. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of
Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 720-33 (1997).
218. An employer may, as Wilson shows, be able to choose to restrict disturbing speech, that
is, not provide an accommodation for it, on some occasions when he would not be justified in
treating the speech as constituting religious harassment. That is, weaker (or different) effects may
warrant a refusal to accommodate than a decision that speech harasses because of religion.
However, if the employer fires someone who has engaged in religious speech specifically to
satisfy religious sensibilities of other workers who do not feel harassed, that would amount to a
form of religious discrimination.
219. Berg, supra note 75, at 991.
220. GREENAWALT, supra note 211, at 95-96.
221. See Volokh, supra note 210, at 1811-16.

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

and that interest can increase as the acts multiply. If the acts together
have effects that are harmful enough, they may lose protection that they
would otherwise have.
This point is easiest to make when an individual, or the same group
of individuals, engages in repeated acts that offend. If the four
Christians in the van continually talk among themselves about how
atheists are damned, after their atheist colleague has explained that this
bothers him, they are failing to exhibit adequate sensitivity to his
feelings. The character of their remarks to each other has altered
somewhat. What was initially insensitive has become rude and
unfeeling. Officials might employ some standard of minimal politeness
to determine whether remarks are protected.
The cumulation problem is greater if unconnected individuals act in
similar ways, 222 but I am still inclined to think cumulation could be
appropriate. One reason is that, typically, the individual workers are
aware of what other workers are doing, so the nature of the acts of each
is affected by each individual's knowledge of what the others do. More
importantly, the remedy for harassment is future restriction, not
punishment. The workers whose comments cause distress are not being
penalized for what they have done; they are being told not to continue it
in light of the harm it is causing.
Although I have concluded that otherwise protected expression may
become unprotected because a number of similar expressions cause
serious distress, I also believe administrators and judges should be very
hesitant to reach the conclusion that otherwise protected comments
should be restricted. The values of free religious expression should not
be lightly disregarded.
My combination of positions opens me up to the following attack:
Whatever you say about protecting expression, judges and
administrators will find harassment too easily and will impose
remedies that are much too sweeping. Indeed, if the harm is caused by
fifteen independent comments, those fashioning a remedy will have no
way to determine what to allow and what to restrict, other than
restricting everything. Further, employers worried about harassment
claims will comfortably forbid all expressions that might in
combination harass. The end result of your flexible approach will be a
drastic over-restriction of religious speech. Therefore, the only

222. See Berg, supra note 75, at 991-93 (distinguishing accumulation by the same individual
from that of several unconnected workers).
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otherwise
sensible approach is the strict one of never allowing 22
3
protected expressions to cumulate into violations of Title VII.
This defense of a strict approach is grounded on the realities of
decisions by employers, administrators, and judges. Whether one
should conclude that this approach is finally persuasive depends on a
closer acquaintance than I have with behavior that is not reflected in
appellate opinions, but I am hesitant to embrace the conclusion that
multiple instances of otherwise protected expression can overwhelm
those with a different religious view or identity and leave them with no
recourse.

22 4

VIII. CONCLUSION
Our study has shown that in the complex intertwining of ordinary
discrimination because of religion, accommodation to religion, and
religious harassment, the law faces deep problems about religious
liberty, diversity, and equality, and about whether workplace speech
should be less robust than wide open speech in public places, which
unwilling listeners can avoid. Questions every bit as troubling as those
that arise under the Religion Ciauses of the First Amendment are
generated by Title VII's prohibition of religious discrimination.
In the course of the discussion, I have made the following more
specific claims.
(1) Religion under Title VII should not be taken in the very broad
sense adopted by the Seeger and Welsh cases for the Selective Service
Act.
(2) Discrimination can be "because of religion" even when selection
is not on grounds of religion. Mandatory religious meetings provide a
notable example.
(3) Employers who make decisions on moral grounds should be able
to rely on religious grounded moral judgments, if other employers
would make similar moral judgments on non-religious grounds.

223. These are my words, but I believe they capture part of Professor Volokh's basis for his
position. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Thinking Ahead About Freedom of Speech and Hostile Work
Environnent Harassment, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 305, 310-12 (1996); Eugene Volokh.
What Speech Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment Law Restrict?, 85 GEO. L.J. 627,
638-46 (1997); see also Volokh, supra note 210, at 1809-12.
224. My position here represents a modest shift from my previous view that "a finding of a
hostile working environment cannot be based exclusively or dominantly on protected remarks."
GREENAWALT, supra note 211, at 95. At that time, without explicitly addressing the possibility
that remarks that might individually be protected could become unprotected in combination, I
apparently rejected that idea.
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(4) Workers should have greater rights to have religious practices
accommodated than the Supreme Court has offered. The government
can impose more than minimal costs on private employers without
violating the Establishment Clause. However, employers should not
have to accept expressive behavior that deeply disturbs other workers
for reasons other than the content of views. Thus, the court in Wilson
rightly decided that U.S. West did not have to allow the wearing of the
anti-abortion button with a photo of a fetus.
(5) Employers should have substantial rights to engage in religious
expression. These rights should parallel their other free speech rights.
They do not extend to mandatory religious services.
(6) The law may appropriately protect religious speech of workers
more than most other speech against a private employer's free decision
to respond negatively to speech.
(7) Government workers have rights of religious speech that parallel
their other rights of free speech.
(8) In so far as the law requires private employers to silence
harassing speech, workers' religious speech should be treated like other
worker speech.
(9) Neither employers nor workers should be privileged to direct
speech at unwilling listeners. Rights of speech are substantially greater
when directed at an audience that is mostly receptive or indifferent, but
some restraints may still be imposed on behalf of listeners who
predictably will be offended.

